Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Baba Kamma

Folio 114a

[even] on the evidence of one witness.¹  This holds good if only one witness was concerned but not where there were two. And even to one witness it applies only if he appeared before judges of Magista,²  but not before the Dawar³  where the judges similarly impose an oath upon the evidence of a single witness. R. Ashi said: When we were at R. Huna's⁴  we raised the question of a prominent man who would be trusted by them as two. [Shall we say that since] money would be adjudicated on his [sole] evidence, he therefore should not bear testimony in their courts, or perhaps since he is a prominent man he can hardly escape their notice and should consequently deliver his evidence? — This question remained undecided.

R. Ashi further said: A son of Israel who sells to a heathen a field bordering on one of a fellow Israelite deserves to have a Shamta pronounced against him. For what reason? If because of the right of [pre-emption enjoyed by] the nearest neighbour to the boundary,⁵  did the Master not state⁶  that where he buys from a heathen or sells to a heathen the right of [pre-emption enjoyed by] the nearest neighbour to the boundary does not apply?⁷  — It must therefore be because the neighbour might say to the vendor: 'You have placed a lion at my border.'⁸  He therefore deserves to have a Shamta pronounced against him unless he accepts upon himself the responsibility for any consequent mishap that might result [from the sale].

MISHNAH. IF CUSTOMS-COLLECTORS TOOK AWAY A MAN'S ASS AND GAVE HIM INSTEAD ANOTHER ASS, OR IF BRIGANDS TOOK AWAY HIS GARMENT AND GAVE HIM INSTEAD ANOTHER GARMENT, IT WOULD BELONG TO HIM, FOR THE OWNERS HAVE SURELY GIVEN UP HOPE OF RECOVERING IT.⁹  IF ONE RESCUED [ARTICLES] FROM A RIVER OR FROM A MARAUDING BAND OR FROM HIGHWAYMEN, IF THE OWNERS HAVE GIVEN UP HOPE OF THEM, THEY WILL BELONG TO HIM.¹⁰  SO ALSO REGARDING SWARMS OF BEES, IF THE OWNERS HAVE GIVEN UP HOPE OF RECOVERING THEM, THEY WOULD BELONG TO HIM. R. JOHANAN B. BEROKA SAID: EVEN A WOMAN OR A MINOR¹¹  IS TRUSTED WHEN STATING THAT THIS SWARM STARTED FROM HERE;¹²  THE OWNER [OF BEES] IS ALLOWED TO WALK INTO THE FIELD OF HIS NEIGHBOUR FOR THE PURPOSE OF RESCUING HIS SWARM, THOUGH IF HE CAUSES DAMAGE HE WOULD HAVE TO PAY FOR THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE HE DOES. HE MAY, HOWEVER, NOT CUT OFF HIS NEIGHBOUR'S BOUGH [UPON WHICH HIS BEES HAVE SETTLED] EDEN THOUGH WITH THE INTENTION OF PAYING HIM ITS VALUE: R. ISHMAEL THE SON OF R. JOHANAN B. BEROKA, HOWEVER, SAID THAT HE MAY EVEN CUT OFF HIS NEIGHBOUR'S BOUGH IF HE MEANS TO REPAY HIM THE VALUE.

GEMARA. A Tanna taught: If he was given [anything by customs-collectors] he would have to restore it to the original proprietors. This view thus maintains that Renunciation by itself does not transfer ownership¹³  and consequently the misappropriated article has at the very outset come into his possession unlawfully;¹⁴  Some, however, read: 'If he cares to give up [the article given him by the customs-collector], he should restore it to the original proprietors',¹⁵  the reason being that Renunciation by itself transfers ownership,¹⁶  so that it is only when [he¹⁷  made up his mind] saying: 'I do not like to benefit from money which is not [really] mine';¹⁸  he must restore it to the original proprietors.

IT WOULD BELONG TO HIM FOR THE OWNERS HAVE SURELY ABANDONED IT.¹⁹  Said R. Ashi:²⁰  This Mishnaic ruling applies only where the robber was a heathen,²¹  but in the case of a robber who was an Israelite this would not be so, as the proprietor surely thinks: [If not to-day to-morrow] I will take him to law.²²  R. Joseph demurred to this, saying: On the contrary, the reverse is more likely. In the case of heathens who usually administer law forcibly²³  the owner need not give up hope,²⁴  whereas in the case of an Israelite where the judges merely issue an order to make restoration [without however employing corporal punishment]²⁵  the owner has surely abandoned any hope of recovery. If therefore a [contrary] statement was ever made it was made only regarding the concluding clause [as follows:] IF ONE RESCUED [ARTICLES] FROM [A RIVER OR FROM] HEATHENS²⁶  OR FROM ROBBERS, IF THE OWNERS HAVE ABANDONED THEM THEY WILL BELONG TO HIM, Implying that as a rule this would not be so. This implication could, however, not be maintained in the case of heathens who usually administer the law forcibly,²⁷  whereas in the case of a robber who was an Israelite, since the judges will merely issue an order to make restoration [without however employing corporal punishment] the owner has surely abandoned any hope of recovery.

We learnt elsewhere: In the case of skins belonging to a lay owner, mere mental determination²⁸  [on the part of the owner] will render them capable of becoming defiled,²⁹  whereas in the case of those belonging to a tanner no mental determination²⁸  would render them capable of becoming defiled.³⁰  Regarding those in possession of a thief mental determination³¹  will render them capable of becoming defiled,³²  whereas those in the possession of a robber no mental determination³³  will render them capable of becoming defiled.³⁴  R. Simeon however, says that the rulings are to be reversed: Regarding those in the possession of a robber mental determination³³  will render them capable of becoming defiled,³⁵  whereas those in the possession of a thief no mental determinations will render them capable of becoming defiled, as in the last case the owners do not usually abandon hope of finding the thief.³⁶  Said 'Ulla: This difference of opinion³⁷  exists only in average cases, but where Renunciation is definitely known to have taken place opinion is unanimous that Renunciation transfers ownership. Rabbah,³⁸  however, said: Even where the Renunciation is definitely known to have taken place there is also a difference of opinion. Abaye said to Rabbah:³⁸  You should not contest the statement of 'Ulla, for in our Mishnah³⁹  we learnt in accordance with him: … as the owners do not usually abandon hope of finding the thief. The reason is that usually the owners do not abandon hope of tracing the thief, but where they definitely abandoned hope of doing so, the skins would have become his. He rejoined:⁴⁰  We interpret the text in our Mishnah, [to mean]⁴¹  'For there is no Renunciation of them on the part of the owners.'⁴²

We have learnt: IF CUSTOMS-COLLECTORS TOOK AWAY A MAN'S ASS AND GAVE HIM INSTEAD ANOTHER ASS OR IF BRIGANDS TOOK AWAY HIS GARMENT AND GAVE HIM INSTEAD ANOTHER GARMENT, IT WOULD BELONG TO HIM, FOR THE OWNERS HAVE SURELY ABANDONED HOPE OF RECOVERING IT. Now whose view is represented here? If we say, that of the Rabbis,⁴³  the ruling in the case of robbers⁴⁴  raises a difficulty.⁴⁵  Again, if that of R. Simeon, the ruling in the case of thieves⁴⁶  raises a difficulty!⁴⁷  The problem, it is true, is easily solved if we accept the view of 'Ulla who stated that where Renunciation was definitely known to have taken place ownership is transferred; the Mishnaic ruling here would then similarly apply to the case where Renunciation was definitely known to have taken place and would thus be unanimous. But on the view of Rabbah who stated that even where the Renunciation is definitely known to have taken place there is still a difference of opinion,⁴⁸  with whose view would the Mishnaic ruling accord? It could neither be with that of the Rabbis nor with that of R. Simeon! — We speak here of an armed highwayman,⁴⁹  and the ruling will be in accordance with R. Simeon. But if so, is this case not identical with [that of a customs-collector acting openly like a] 'robber'?⁵⁰  — Yes, but two kinds of robbers⁵¹  are spoken of.

Come and hear: If a thief,⁵²  a robber, or an annas⁵³  consecrates a misappropriated article, it is duly consecrated; if he sets aside the portion for the priest's gift,⁵⁴  it is genuine terumah; or again if he sets aside the portion for the Levite's gift,⁵⁵  the tithe is valid.⁵⁶  Now, whose view does this teaching follow? If [we say] that of the Rabbis, the case of robbers creates a difficulty,⁵⁷  if that of R. Simeon, the case of the thief creates a difficulty?⁵⁸  The problem, it is true, is easily solved if we accept the view of 'Ulla who stated that where Renunciation was definitely known to have taken place ownership is transferred; the Mishnaic ruling here would then similarly apply to the case where Renunciation was definitely known to have taken place, and would thus be unanimous. But if we adopt the view of Rabbah who stated that even where the Renunciation is definitely known to have taken place there is still a difference of opinion,⁵⁹  with whose view would the Mishnaic ruling accord? It could be neither in accordance with the Rabbis nor in accordance with R. Simeon? — Here too an armed highwayman is meant, and the ruling will be in accordance with R. Simeon. But if so, is this case not identical with that of 'robber'? — Yes, two kinds of robbers are spoken of. Or if you wish I may alternatively say that this teaching is in accordance with Rabbi, as taught: 'Rabbi says: A thief is in this respect [subject to the same law] as a robber',

1. Whereas according to Scripture no less than two witnesses are required; cf. Deut. XIX, 15.
2. 'Magistratus': v. Targ. II, Esth. IX, 3; also S. Krauss, Lehnworter, II, 322; 'untrained magistrates', Jast. 'a village court', Rashi a.l.
3. 'The Persian Circuit Court' (Jast.).
4. R. Kahana's according to MS.M., followed here also by Asheri a.l.
5. V. B.M. 108a.
6. Ibid. 108b.
7. For he who is outside the covenant of the law could not be compelled to abide by its principles.
8. [It was no uncommon practice for the unscrupulous heathen to interfere with the irrigation on which the life of the neighbouring fields depended and then force the owners to move out and seek their existence elsewhere, v. Funk, Die Juden in Babylonien I, p. 16.]
9. And as after the Renunciation on the part of the owner there followed a change of possession, ownership was transferred to the possessor.
10. Cf. B.M. 27a.
11. Whose evidence is generally not accepted; v. Shebu. IV, 1 and supra p. 507.
12. And thus establish the ownership of the swarm; for the reason see the discussion infra in the Gemara.
13. As indeed maintained by R. Joseph supra p. 383, or even by Rabbah according to Tosaf. on B.K. 67b.
14. According to Tosaf. ibid, the true owner abandoned the article only after it changed hands from the customs-collector to the new possessor; the Mishnaic ruling, however, deals with another case as explained supra p. 670, n. 1.
15. [MSM.: 'to the customs-collector' (since he acquired it by Renunciation)].
16. V. supra p. 382 and Tosaf. on 67b.
17. Being scrupulous.
18. Though strict law could not enforce it in this case.
19. And as after the Renunciation on the part of the owner there followed a change of possession, ownership was transferred to the possessor.
20. 'R. Assi' according to Asheri; cf. D.S. and supra p. 657, n. 11.
21. In which case the person robbed might be afraid to force him to pay.
22. And thus never gives up hope of recovering the misappropriated article.
23. Lit., 'haughtily' (Rashi). Krauss, Lehnworter: lit., 'Gothism', referring to the Goths in the Roman army.
24. For the robber will be forced by the heathen judges to make restoration even upon the strength of circumstantial evidence, however slender.
25. But on the other hand take all circumstantial evidence as baseless suggestions and thus require sound testimony to be borne by truthful witnesses.
26. Who are designated in the Mishnah a troop of invaders. [MS.M. however reads here too MARAUDING BAND.]
27. V. p. 671, n. 10.
28. To use them as they are.
29. As his mental determination is final, and the skins could thus be considered as fully finished articles and thus subject to the law of defilement.
30. As a tanner usually prepares his skins for the public, and it is for the buyer to decide what article he is going to make out of them.
31. On the part of the thief to use them as they are.
32. For the skins became the property of the thief, as Renunciation usually follows theft on account of the fact that the owner does not know against whom to bring an action.
33. On the part of the robber to use them as they are.
34. For the skins did not become the property of the robber as robbery does not usually cause Renunciation, since the owner knows against whom to bring an action.
35. For the skins became the property of the robber as the owner has surely renounced every hope of recovering them for fear of the robber who acted openly.
36. V. Kel. XXVI, 8 and supra p. 384.
37. Between R. Simeon and the other Rabbis.
38. Var. lec. 'Raba'.
39. Kel. XXVI, 8 and supra p. 384.
40. I.e., Rabbah to Abaye.
41. Cf. Tosaf. s.v. [H]
42. Since the skins were taken away stealthily the owner will never in reality give up hope of tracing the thief and recovering them, even though they may express their despair of their return.
43. Who oppose R. Simeon.
44. I.e., the customs-collector who acts openly.
45. For according to them there is no Renunciation in the case of a robber.
46. I.e., the brigand.
47. For according to him there is no Renunciation in the case of a thief.
48. Between R. Simeon and the other Rabbis.
49. Acting openly and not stealthily; cf. supra 57a.
50. Why then repeat the ruling in two identical cases?
51. I.e., customs-collectors and brigands.
52. V. supra p. 386.
53. Lit., 'a violent man'; the same as the hamsan, who as explained supra p. 361, is prepared to pay for the objects which he misappropriates.
54. Cf. Num. XVIII, 11-12.
55. Cf. Num. ibid. 21.
56. For it is assumed that the proprietors are already resigned to the loss of the misappropriated articles, so that ownership has changed hands, v. supra 67a.
57. For according to them there is no Renunciation in the case of a robber.
58. For according to him there is no Renunciation in the case of a thief.
59. Between R. Simeon and the other Rabbis.

and it is a known fact that it was to the law applicable to a robber according to R. Simeon¹  [to which a thief was made subject in this statement of Rabbi].²

The above text [states]: 'Rabbi says: I maintain that a thief is [in this respect subject to the same law] as a robber.' The question was asked: Did he mean to [make him subject to the law applicable to a] robber as laid down by the Rabbis,³  in which case ownership is not transferred, or did he perhaps mean to [make him subject to the law applicable to a] robber as defined by R. Simeon,¹  in which case the ownership is transferred? Come and hear: IF CUSTOMS-COLLECTORS TOOK AWAY A MAN'S ASS AND GAVE HIM INSTEAD ANOTHER ASS, OR IF BRIGANDS TOOK AWAY HIS GARMENT, IT WOULD BELONG TO HIM, FOR THE OWNERS HAVE SURELY ABANDONED IT. Now, with whose view does this ruling accord? If with that of the Rabbis, the case of the robber⁴  raises a difficulty;⁵  if with that of R. Simeon, the case of the thief⁶  raises a difficulty.⁷  The difficulty is easily solved if you say that Rabbi meant [to make the thief subject to the law] applicable to a robber as defined by R. Simeon,¹  in which case ownership is transferred; the ruling in the Mishnah would then be in accordance with Rabbi, as on this account ownership would be transferred. But if you say that he meant [to make him subject] to the law of robber as defined by the Rabbis,³  in which case ownership will not be transferred, whom will the Mishnaic ruling⁸  follow? It will be In accordance neither with Rabbi nor with R. Simeon nor with the Rabbis? — The robber spoken of here is an armed brigand⁹  and the ruling will be in accordance with R. Simeon.¹  But if so, is this case not identical with [that of a customs-collector acting openly like a] 'robber'?¹⁰  — Yes, two kinds of robbers¹¹  are spoken of.

Come and hear: If a thief, a robber or an annus consecrates a misappropriated article, it is duly consecrated; if he sets aside the portion for the priests' gift, it is genuine terumah; or again, if he sets aside a portion for the Levite's gift, the tithe is valid.¹²  Now, with whose view does this teaching accord? If [we say] it is in accordance with the Rabbis, the case of the robber creates a difficulty?¹³  If again [we say] it is in accordance with R. Simeon, the case of the thief¹⁴  creates a difficulty.¹⁵  The difficulty, it is true, is easily solved if you say that Rabbi meant [to make the thief subject to the same law] as robber as defined by R. Simeon in which case ownership is transferred; the ruling in this teaching would then be in accordance with Rabbi, as on this account ownership would be transferred. But if you say that he meant [to make him] subject to the law of robber as defined by the [other] Rabbis, in which case ownership will not be transferred, in accordance with whom will be this ruling?¹⁶  — The thief here spoken of is an armed robber¹⁷  and the ruling will thus be in accordance with R. Simeon.¹⁸  But if so, is this case not identical with that of 'robber'?¹⁰  Yes, but two kinds of robbers are spoken of. R. Ashi said to Rabbah: Come and hear that which Rabbi taught to R. Simeon his son: The words 'anything which could serve as security' should not [be taken literally to] mean actual security, for even if he left a cow to plough with or an ass to drive, they would be liable to restore it because of the honour of their father.¹⁹  Now, the reason is to save the name of their father, but if not for the honour of their father it would not be so,²⁰  thus proving²¹  that Rabbi referred in his statement to the law of a robber²²  as defined by R. Simeon. This proves it.

SO ALSO REGARDING SWARMS OF BEES. What is the point [here] of SO ALSO?²³  — It means this: Even regarding swarms of bees where the proprietorship is only of Rabbinic sanction, and therefore²⁴  you might have thought that since the title to them has only Rabbinic authority behind it,²⁵  we presume the owner generally to have resigned his right [unless we know definitely to the contrary], we are told that it was only where the proprietors have [explicitly] renounced them that this will be so,²⁶  but if not, this will not be so.

R. JOHANAN B. BEROKA SAID [THAT] EVEN A WOMAN OR A MINOR IS TRUSTED WHEN STATING THAT THIS SWARM STARTED FROM HERE. Are a woman and a minor competent to give evidence?²⁷  — Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel: We are dealing here with a case where, e.g., the proprietors were chasing the bees²⁸  and a woman or a minor speaking in all innocence²⁹  said that this swarm started from here.

R. Ashi said: Remarks made by a person in the course of speaking in all innocence cannot be taken as evidence, with the exception only of evidence [of the death of a husband] for the release of his wife.³⁰  Said Rabina to R. Ashi: Is there no other case in which it would be taken as evidence? Surely in the case of a swarm of bees we deal with a remark made in all innocence?³¹  The case of a swarm of bees is different, as the ownership of it has only Rabbinic sanction. But does not the same apply to ordinances based on the Written Law?³²  Did not Rab Judah say that Samuel stated³³  that a certain man speaking in all innocence declared, 'I remember that when I was a child I was once hoisted on the shoulders of my father, and taken out of school and stripped of my shirt and immersed in water³⁴  in order that I might partake of terumah in the evening,'³⁵  and R. Hanina completed the statement thus: 'And my comrades were kept separate from me³⁶  and called me, Johanan who partakes of hallah,'³⁷  and Rabbi raised him to the status of priesthood upon the strength of [this statement of] his own mouth?³⁸  — This was only for the purpose of eating terumah of mere Rabbinic authority.³⁹  Still, would this not apply⁴⁰  also to [prohibitions based on] the Written Law? Surely when R. Dimi arrived⁴¹  he stated that R. Hana of Kartigna,⁴²  or, as others said, R. Aha of Kartigna related a certain case brought before R. Joshua b. Levi, or, as others say, before Rabbi, regarding a certain child speaking in all innocence who said, 'I and my mother were taken captive among heathens; whenever I went out to draw water I was thinking only of my mother, and when I went out to gather wood I was thinking only of my mother.' And Rabbi permitted her to be married to a priest on the strength of [the statement⁴³  made by] the child!⁴⁴  — In the case of a woman taken captive the Rabbis were always lenient.⁴⁵

HE MAY HOWEVER NOT CUT OFF HIS NEIGHBOUR'S BOUGH [etc.]. It was taught:⁴⁶  R. Ishmael the son of R. Johanan b. Beroka said: It is a stipulation of the Court of Law that the owner of the bees be entitled to come down into his neighbour's field and cut off his bough [upon which his bees have settled], in order to rescue his swarm of bees, while the owner of the bough will be paid the value of his bough out of the other's swarm; It is [similarly] a stipulation of the Court of Law that the owner of the wine pour out the wine [from the flask] in order to save in it the other man's honey,⁴⁷  and that he can recover the value of his wine out of the other's honey.⁴⁷  It is [again] a stipulation of the Court of Law that [the owner of the wood] should remove his wood [from his ass] and load on it the other man's flax [from the ass that fell dead], and that he can recover the value of his wood out of the other's flax; for it was upon this condition that Joshua divided the Land among the Israelites.⁴⁶

MISHNAH. IF A MAN IDENTIFIES HIS ARTICLES OR BOOKS IN THE POSSESSION OF ANOTHER PERSON, AND A RUMOUR OF BURGLARY IN HIS PLACE HAD ALREADY BEEN CURRENT IN TOWN, THE PURCHASER [WHILE PLEADING PURCHASE IN MARKET OVERT] WOULD HAVE TO SWEAR HOW MUCH HE PAID [FOR THEM]⁴⁸  AND WOULD BE PAID ACCORDINGLY [AS HE RESTORES THE ARTICLES OR BOOKS TO THE PLAINTIFF]. BUT IF THIS WAS NOT SO, HE COULD NOT BE BELIEVED, FOR I MAY SAY THAT HE SOLD THEM TO ANOTHER PERSON FROM WHOM THE DEFENDANT PURCHASED THEM [IN A LAWFUL MANNER].

GEMARA. But even if a rumour of burglary in his place had already been current in town, why should the law be so?⁴⁹  Why not still suspect that it was he⁵⁰  who sold them [in the market] and it was he⁵⁰  himself who circulated the rumour? — Rab Judah said in the name of Rab: [We suppose that] e.g., people had entered his house and he rose in the middle of the night and called for help, crying out that he was being robbed. But is this not all the more reason for suspecting that he⁵⁰  was merely looking for a pretext? — R. Kahana therefore completed the statement made in the name of Rab as follows: [We suppose] e.g., that a breach was found to have been made in his house and persons who lodged in his house were going out with bundles of articles upon their shoulders so that everyone was saying that so-and-so had had a burglary.⁵¹  But still, there might have been there only articles, but not any books! — R. Hiyya b. Abba said in the name of R. Johanan: [We suppose] that they were all saying that books also were there. But why not apprehend that they might have been little books while he is claiming big ones? — Said R. Jose b. Hanina: [We suppose] they say, Such and such a book. But still they might perhaps have been old books while he is claiming new ones? — Rab⁵²  said: [We suppose] they were all saying that these were the articles of so-and-so and these were the books of so-and-so. But did Rab really say so?⁵³  Did Rab not say⁵⁴  that if a thief entered a house by breaking in and misappropriated articles and departed with them he would be free,⁵⁵  the reason being that he acquired title to them through the risk of life [to which he exposed himself]?⁵⁶  — This last ruling that ownership is transferred applies only where the thief entered by breaking in, in which case he from the very outset exposed himself to the risk of being killed, but to those who lodged in his house, since they did not expose themselves to the risk of being killed, this ruling cannot apply. Raba said: All these qualifications apply only to a proprietor⁵⁷  who keeps his goods for sale, but in the case of a proprietor who does not keep his goods for sale,

1. Who holds that there is Renunciation in the case of a robber.
2. Maintaining that there is Renunciation both in the case of robbery and in the case of theft.
3. Who hold that there is no Renunciation in the case of a robber.
4. I.e., the customs-collector who acts openly.
5. For according to them there is no Renunciation in the case of a robber.
6. I.e., the brigand.
7. For according to him there is no Renunciation in the case of a thief.
8. Maintaining that there is Renunciation both in the case of robbery and in the case of theft.
9. Acting openly and not stealthily; cf. supra 57a.
10. Why then repeat the ruling in two identical cases?
11. I.e., customs-collectors and brigands.
12. For notes v. supra p. 674.
13. For according to them there is no Renunciation in the case of a robber.
14. I.e., the brigand.
15. For according to him there is no Renunciation in the case of a thief.
16. Maintaining that there is Renunciation both in the case of robbery and in the case of theft.
17. Acting openly and not stealthily.
18. Who maintains Renunciation in the case of a robber.
19. V. supra p. 653, n. 9.
20. They would thus surely be entitled to retain the misappropriated article on account of Renunciation on the part of the owner.
21. According to established halachah that the possession of heirs is not on the same footing in law as the possession of a purchaser, and does not therefore constitute a legal change of possession.
22. Maintaining that there is Renunciation both in the case of robbery and in the case of theft.
23. For why should a swarm of bees be taken to be different from any other kind of property?
24. For since they cannot be properly controlled, property in them is not so absolute as in other articles. V. Hul. 141b.
25. Generally conveying no right in rem and thus no legal ownership in substance.
26. I.e., that their right will come to an end.
27. As they are exempt from having to appear as witnesses, the testimony borne by them in a Court of Law is not possessed of that absolute impartiality which is the most essential feature in all evidence; cf. supra p. 507.
28. Even before the minor or woman made a statement to their benefit, so that the testimony is corroborated by circumstantial evidence.
29. Without any intention of giving evidence.
30. Cf. Yeb. XVI, 5-7.
31. As stated in our Mishnah here.
32. I.e., would ordinary conversation not be trusted?
33. Keth. 26a.
34. In a mikweh to become levitically clean; cf. Kid. 80a.
35. As in Ber. I, 1.
36. Not to cause defilement.
37. Which is the first of the dough and is on a par with terumah; v. Num. XV, 19-21.
38. Though a prohibition of the Written Law was involved and the man was talking in all innocence.
39. For Rabbi lived after the destruction of the Temple when (according to some authorities) all terumah was of mere Rabbinic sanction; cf. Pes. 44a.
40. I.e., would ordinary conversation not be trusted?
41. From Palestine to Babylon; v. Rashi M.K. 3b.
42. I.e., Carthage rebuilt under the Roman Empire on the northern coast of Africa.
43. From which it appeared that no immoral act was committed upon the mother.
44. Keth. 27b. Though the prohibition involved was Biblical, for according to Lev. XXI, 7, a priest may not marry a woman who had immoral intercourse.
45. On account of the immoral act being a matter of mere apprehension; cf. Keth. 23a.
46. Supra 81b.
47. Cf. Mishnah infra 115a.
48. Cf. the oath in Litem administered by the Romans though in different circumstances; v. Dig. 12, 3. Cod. 5, 33; 8, 4, 9; cf. also supra p. 359 and Shebu. VII, 1-3.
49. I.e., to force the possessor to make restoration.
50. The plaintiff.
51. There is thus some circumstantial evidence to corroborate the plaintiff's allegations.
52. More correctly Abbahu as in MS.M.
53. V. p. 679. n. 4.
54. Sanh. 72a.
55. From pecuniary liability.
56. According to Ex. XXII, 1, and since at the time of breaking in the offence was capital, all civil liabilities merge in it; v. supra p. 192, n. 8. [Consequently the purchaser could not be forced to make restoration seeing that the thief himself is exempt.]
57. Lit., 'house-owner'.