If, however, the estate consists only of the best and of the worst qualities, creditors for damages are paid out of the best whereas those for loans and marriage contracts are paid out of the worst quality. Now1 the intermediate clause states that if the estate consists only of the medium and the worst qualities, creditors for either damages or loans are paid out of the medium quality whereas marriage contracts will be paid out of the worst quality. If, therefore, you still maintain that the calculation is based only upon the qualities of the defendant's estate, is not the medium [when there is no better with him] his best? Why then should not the creditors for loans be thrown back on the worst quality? — This [intermediate clause] deals with a case where the defendant originally possessed2 property of a better quality but has meanwhile disposed of it. And R. Hisda likewise explained this [intermediate clause] to deal with a case where the defendant originally possessed2 property of a better quality but has meanwhile disposed of it. This explanation stands to reason, for it is taught elsewhere: If the estate consisted of the medium and the worst qualities, creditors for damages are paid out of the medium quality whereas those for loans and marriage contracts will be paid out of the worst quality. Now these [two Baraithas] do not contradict each other, unless we accept [the explanation that] the one deals with a case where the defendant originally owned property of a better quality but which he has meanwhile disposed of, while the other states the law for a case where he did not have3 property of a quality better than the medium in his possession. It may, however, on the other hand be suggested that both [Baraithas] state the law when a better quality was not disposed of4 and there is yet no contradiction, as the second [Baraitha] presents a case where the defendant's medium quality is as good as the best quality of the general public,5 whereas in the first [Baraitha] the medium quality was not so good as the best of the public.6 It may again be suggested that both [Baraithas] present a case where the defendant's medium quality was not better than the medium quality of the general public and the point at issue is this: the second [Baraitha] bases the calculation upon the qualities of the defendant's estate,7 but the first bases it upon those of the general public.8
Rabina said: The point at issue is the view expressed by 'Ulla.9 For 'Ulla said: Creditors for loans may, according to Pentateuchal Law, be paid out of the worst, as it is said, Thou shalt stand without, and the man to whom thou dost lend shall bring forth the pledge without unto thee.10 Now it is certainly in the nature of man [debtor] to bring out the worst of his chattels. Why then is it laid down that creditors for loans are paid out of the medium quality?11 This is a Rabbinic enactment made in order that prospective borrowers should not find the door of their benefactors locked before them. Now this enactment referred to by 'Ulla is accepted by the first [Baraitha] whereas the second disapproves of this enactment.12
Our Rabbis taught: If a defendant13 disposed of all his land14 to one or to three persons at one and the same time, they all have stepped into the place of the original owner.15 [If, however, the three sales took place] one after another, creditors of all descriptions will be paid out of the [property purchased] last;16 if this property does not cover [the liability], the last but one purchased estate is resorted to [for the balance]; if this estate again does not meet [the whole obligation], the very first purchased estate is resorted to [for the outstanding balance].
'If the defendant disposed of all his land to one' — under what circumstances [was it disposed of]? It could hardly be suggested [that it was effected] by one and the same deed, for if in the case of three persons whose purchases may have been after one another,17 you state that, 'They all have stepped into the place of the original owner,' what need is there to mention one person purchasing all the estate by one and the same deed? It therefore seems pretty certain [that the estate disposed of to one person was effected by] deeds of different dates. But [then] why such a distinction?18 Just as in the case of three purchasers [in succession] each can [in the first instance] refer any creditor [to the very last purchased property], saying, '[When I bought my estate] I was careful to leave [with the defendant] plenty for you to be paid out of,'19 why should not also one purchaser [by deeds of different dates] be entitled to throw the burden of payment on to the very last purchased property, saying, '[When I acquired title to the former purchases] I was very careful to leave for you plenty to be paid out of'? — We are dealing here with a case where the property purchased last was of the best quality;20 also R. Shesheth stated that [this law applies] when the property purchased last was of the best quality. If this be the case, why [on the other hand] should not creditors of all kinds come and be paid out of the best quality [as this was the property purchased last]? — Because the defendant may say to the creditors: 'If you acquiesce and agree to be paid out of the qualities respectively allotted to you by law, you may be paid accordingly, otherwise I will transfer the deed of the worst property back to the original owner — in which case you will all be paid out of the worst.'21 If so,
Baba Kamma 8b
why should the same not be said regarding creditors for damages?1 It must therefore he surmised that we deal with [a case where the vendor has meanwhile died, and, as his] heirs are not personally liable to pay,2 the original liability [which accompanied the purchased properties] must always remain upon the purchaser;3 who could consequently no longer [threaten the creditors and] say this: ['If you acquiesce …'?]4 — But the reason the creditors cannot be paid out of the best is that the vendee may [repudiate their demand and] say to them: 'On what account have the Rabbis enacted that "property disposed of by a debtor can not be attached by his creditors so long as there are available possessions still not disposed of"5 if not for the sake of protecting my interests? In the present instance I have no interest in availing myself of this enactment.' Exactly as Raba, for Raba elsewhere said: Whoever asserts, 'I have no desire to avail myself of a Rabbinical enactment' such as this is listened to.6 To what does 'such as this' refer? — To R. Huna, for R. Huna said: A woman is entitled to say to her husband, 'I don't expect any maintenance from you7 and I do not want to work for you.'8
It is quite certain that if the vendee9 has sold the medium and worst qualities and retained the best, creditors of all descriptions may come along and collect out of the best quality. For this property was acquired by him last; and, since the medium and worst qualities are no more in his possession, he is not in a position to say to the creditors: 'Take payment out of the medium and worst properties, as I have no interest in availing myself of the Rabbinic enactment.'10 But what is the law when the vendee disposed of the best quality and retained the medium and the worst? — Abaye at first was inclined to say: Creditors of all descriptions are entitled to come and collect out of the best.11 But Raba said to him.12 Does not a vendee selling [property] to a sub-vendee assign to him all the rights [connected] therewith] that may accrue to him?13 Hence just as when the creditors come to claim from the vendee, he is entitled to pay them out of the medium and the worst [respectively], irrespective of the fact that when the medium and the worst qualities were purchased by him, the best property still remained free with the original vendor, and in spite of the enactment that properties disposed of cannot be distrained on [at the hands of the vendee] so long as there is available [with the debtor] property undisposed of,14 the reason of the exception being that the vendee is entitled to say that he has no interest in availing himself of this enactment, so is the subvendee similarly entitled to say to the creditors: 'Take payment out of the medium and the worst.'15 For the sub-vendee entered into the sale only upon the understanding that any right that his vendor may possess in connection with the purchase should also be assigned to him.
Raba said:16 If Reuben disposed of all his lands to Simeon who in his turn sold one of the fields to Levi, Reuben's creditor may come and collect out of the land which is in the possession either of Simeon or Levi. This law applies only when Levi bought medium quality; but if he purchased either the best or the worst the law is otherwise, as Levi may lawfully contend: 'I have purposely been careful to buy the best or the worst, that is, property which is not available for you.'17 Again, even when he bought medium quality the creditor will not have this option unless Levi did not leave [with Simeon] medium quality of a similar nature, in which case he is unable to plead, 'l have left for you ample land with Simeon;' but if Levi did leave with Simeon medium quality of a similar nature the creditor is not entitled to distrain on Levi who may lawfully contend, 'I have left for you ample land [with Simeon] to satisfy your claim from it.
Abaye said:18 If Reuben had disposed of a field to Simeon with a warranty [of indemnity],19 and an alleged creditor of Reuben came to distrain on it from Simeon, Reuben is entitled by law to come forward and litigate with the creditor, nor can the latter say to him: 'You [Reuben] are no party to me;'20 for Reuben will surely say to him: 'If you will deprive Simeon of the field purchased by him from me, he will turn on me.'21 There are some who say: Even if there were no warranty there the same law applies, as Reuben may say to the alleged creditor: 'I don't want Simeon to have any grievance against me.'
And Abaye further said:22 If Reuben sold a field to Simeon without a warranty [for indemnity]
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