Rabbi holds that goodwill benefit has money value, whilst R. Jose son of R. Judah holds that goodwill benefit has no money value.1 — No. All agree that goodwill benefit has no monetary value, but here they disagree over unseparated [priestly] dues.2 But since goodwill benefit has no monetary value, what does it matter whether they have been separated or not?3 — But this is Rabbi's reason: the Rabbis penalised the thief, that he may not steal; whereas R. Jose son of R. Judah maintains that the Rabbis penalised the owner, that he should not delay with his tebel.4 Raba said:5 Terumah is different, this being the reason that they can take it against his will: for terumah is fit only for priests, and since he came and forbade it to them, he rendered it just like dust.6
MISHNAH. [IF SHE VOWS,] 'KONAM THAT I DO NOT AUGHT FOR7 MY FATHER,' 'YOUR FATHER,' 'MY BROTHER,' OR, 'YOUR BROTHER,' [THE HUSBAND] CANNOT ANNUL IT. 'THAT I DO NOT AUGHT FOR YOU,' HE NEED NOT ANNUL.8 R. AKIBA SAID: HE MUST ANNUL IT, LEST SHE EXCEED HER OBLIGATIONS.9 R. JOHANAN B. NURI SAID: HE MUST ANNUL IT, LEST HE DIVORCE HER AND SHE THEREBY BE FORBIDDEN TO HIM.
GEMARA. Samuel said: The halachah is as R. Johanan b. Nuri. Shall we say that in Samuel's opinion a man can consecrate that which is non-existent?10 But the following contradicts it: If a man consecrates his wife's handiwork [which she will produce],
Original footnotes renumbered.
- Hence the first clause of the Mishnah under discussion agrees with R. Jose b. R. Judah, and the second with Rabbi.
- Rabbi regards the whole as hullin, whilst R. Jose b. R. Judah maintains that since they would have had to be separated eventually, they are regarded as though already removed from the whole, and therefore he must pay only for its hullin.
- Since they must eventually be separated.
- But render its dues immediately after harvesting. He therefore receives a payment only for its hullin. Presumably he is nevertheless required to render the priestly dues or their value on the stolen produce.
- In reconciling the discrepancy between the two clauses.
- I.e., entirely valueless, as far as he is concerned, and therefore the priests can take it.
- Lit., 'for the mouth'.
- Since she is bound to work for him.
- The amount of work she is obliged to do for him is prescribed in Keth. 64b. Her vow is valid in respect of everything above that, and therefore the husband must annul the vow.
- Lit., 'a thing that has not come into the world'. For the prohibition of a vow is a manner of consecration, v. p. 105, n. 8. Now, according to R. Johanan b. Nuri that prohibition is effective in respect of anything she may do after he divorces her, though as yet she is neither divorced nor has she produced anything: hence, just as a vow is valid in respect of the non-existent, so is consecration too, and since Samuel accepts this ruling as the halachah, it must be his view too.
she may work and provide for herself, and as for the surplus, R. Meir1 rules that it is hekdesh.2 R. Johanan the sandal-maker ruled that it is hullin.3 Whereon Samuel said: The halachah is as R. Johanan the sandal-maker, thus proving that a man cannot consecrate the non-existent. And should you reply that he ruled that the halachah is as R. Johanan b. Nuri only in respect of the excess;4 then he should have said, The halachah is as R. Johanan b. Nuri in respect of the excess, or, the halachah is as the first Tanna,5 or, the halachah is not as R. Akiba? — But, said R. Joseph, konamoth6 are different: since a man can interdict his neighbour's fruit to himself, he can prohibit to himself the non-existent.7 Said Abaye to him: It is proper that one may prohibit his neighbour's fruit to himself, since he can forbid his own fruit to his neighbour: but shall he forbid the non-existent to his neighbour, seeing that he cannot interdict his neighbour's fruit to his neighbour!8 — But, said R. Huna the son of R. Joshua, it means that she vowed, 'My hands be consecrated in respect of what they may produce';9 [the vow is valid even after divorce,] because her hands are already in existence. But if she vowed thus, would they be consecrated [and forbidden]? surely her hands are pledged to her husband.10 She vowed, 'When he divorces me.' But now at least she is not divorced: how then do you know that such a declaration is valid?
Original footnotes renumbered.
- Var. lec.: Tarfon.
- Because one can consecrate the non-existent.
- He holds that one cannot consecrate the non-existent.
- For since R. Johanan b. Nuri rejects R. Akiba's reason, it follows that in his opinion the surplus belongs to the husband, not to the wife.
- Who also holds that the excess belongs to the husband, since he maintains he need not annul.
- I.e., prohibitions, arising as a result of vows, v. supra p. 105, n. 8.
- For in real consecration one cannot consecrate his neighbour's property.
- Abaye objects that the analogy is defective. For in both cases cited by R. Joseph. viz., prohibiting his neighbour's produce and prohibiting the non-existent to himself, there is when vowing one element of the vow under his control — himself. But if a woman interdicts her earnings to her husband, neither her husband nor her future earnings are in her control when she vows.
- So that whatever my hands produce shall be forbidden.
- And since the vow cannot take immediate effect, it cannot become effective after divorce.