Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Shabbath

Folio 4a

the other, into a different courtyard.¹  Even as Raba asked R. Nahman: If a person holds a handful of produce in his hand and he extends it without,²  may he withdraw it into the same courtyard? He replied, It is permitted. And what about another courtyard? Said he to him, It is forbidden. And what is the difference? — When you measure out a measure of salt for it!³  There his intention is not carried out; here his intention is carried out.⁴

[To revert to] the main text: 'R. Bibi b. Abaye propounded: If one places a loaf of bread in an oven, do they permit him to remove it before he incurs the liability of a sin-offering or not?' R. Aha b. Abaye said to Rabina: What are the circumstances? Shall we say [that he did it] unwittingly and he did remind himself;⁵  then whom are they to permit?⁶  Hence it must surely mean that he did afterwards become aware thereof,⁷  but then would he be liable? Surely we learnt: All who are liable to sin-offerings are liable only if the beginning and end [of the forbidden action] are unwitting. On the other hand, if his problem refers to a deliberate action, he should have asked [whether he may remove it] before he comes to an interdict involving stoning!⁸ — R. Shila said: After all, it means unwittingly; and [as to the question] 'whom are they to permit?', [the reply is], Others. R. Shesheth demurred: Is then a person told, 'Sin, in order that your neighbour may gain thereby?'⁹  Rather, said R. Ashi, after all it refers to a deliberate act; but say [in the problem], before he comes to an interdict involving stoning.¹⁰  R. Aba son of Raba recited it explicitly: R. Bibi b. Abaye said: If one places a loaf in an oven, he is permitted to remove it before he comes to an interdict involving stoning.

IF THE POOR MAN STRETCHES OUT HIS HAND. Why is he liable? Surely removal and depositing must be from [and into] a place four [handbreadths] square,¹¹  which is absent here?¹²  — Said Rabbah: The author of this [Mishnah], is R. Akiba, who maintains: We do not require a place four by four. For we learnt: If one throws [an article] from one private domain to another and public ground lies between: R. Akiba holds him liable; but the Sages hold him not liable. R. Akiba holds: We say, An object intercepted by [air] is as though it rested there;¹³  While the Rabbis maintain: We do not say, An object intercepted by [air] is as though it rested there. Shall we say that Rabbah is certain that they differ as to whether an object intercepted is considered at rest,

1. When one stands in a courtyard, which is private ground, and stretches his laden hand into the street, he may withdraw it into the same courtyard, but not into an adjoining one and drop the article there.
2. I.e., into the street.
3. A jesting remark: then I will tell you the difference.
4. If he stretches out his hand into the street he wants to remove the produce from that courtyard. Hence he may draw it back into the same, when his intention remains unfulfilled, but not into an adjoining courtyard, whereby his intention would be carried out.
5. Before it was completely baked, that it was the Sabbath, or that baking on the Sabbath is forbidden.
6. Being unaware of anything wrong, he does not come to ask.
7. Before it was baked.
8. Which is the penalty for the deliberate desecration of the Sabbath, and not 'before he incurs the liability of a sin-offering'?
9. Can one be told to infringe the minor injunction of removing bread from an oven in order to save his neighbour from the greater transgression of baking on the Sabbath?
10. From this it is obvious that R. Bibi's original question was merely whether he is permitted to remove it or not. 'Before he incurs etc.,' was a later addition, which R. Ashi emends. The same assumption must be made in similar cases. V. Kaplan, Redaction of the Talmud, Ch. XIII.
11. Removal from one domain and depositing in the other necessitates in each case that the object shall rest upon a place four handbreadths square.
12. A person's hand does not fulfil this condition.
13. Hence when it crosses public ground it is as though it rested there, and so liability is incurred.

and when it [crosses the public domain] within ten handbreadths [of the ground]?¹  But surely Rabbah asked a question thereon. For Rabbah propounded: Do they disagree when it is below ten, and they differ in this: R. Akiba holds, An object intercepted is as through it rested, while the Rabbis hold that it is not as though it rested; but above ten all agree that he is not liable, all holding that we do not derive throwing from reaching across?²  Or perhaps they disagree when it is above ten, and they differ in this: R. Akiba holds, We derive throwing from reaching across, while the Rabbis hold, We do not learn throwing from reaching across; but below ten all agree that he is liable. What is the reason? We say that an object intercepted is as though it rested? — That is no difficulty: after propounding, he solved it that R. Akiba holds that an object intercepted is as though it rested.³

But perhaps he [R. Akiba] does not require depositing [on a place four handbreadths square], yet he may require removal [from such a place]?⁴  Rather, said R. Joseph, the author of this [Mishnah] is Rabbi. Which [ruling of] Rabbi [intimates this]? Shall we say, This [ruling of] Rabbi: If one throws [an object]⁵  and it comes to rest upon a projection,⁶  of a small size,⁷  Rabbi holds him liable; the Sages exempt him? [But] surely there, as we will state below, it is in accordance with Abaye. For Abaye said: The reference here is to a tree standing in private ground while its branch inclines to the street, and one throws [an article] and it comes to rest upon the branch,⁸  Rabbi holding, We say, cast the branch after its trunk;⁹  but the Rabbis maintain; We do not rule, Cast the branch after its stock? — Rather it is this [ruling of] Rabbi. For it was taught: If one throws [an article] from public to public ground, and private ground lies between: Rabbi holds him liable; but the Sages exempt him. Now, Rab Judah said in Samuel's name: Rabbi imposed a twofold liability, one on account of carrying out and one on account of carrying in:¹⁰  this proves that neither removal nor depositing requires a place four by four. But surely it was stated thereon, Rab and Samuel both assert,

1. For the space above ten does not rank as public ground.
2. If one reaches over an object from private to private ground across public ground, even if it is above ten handbreadths, he is liable.
3. Var. lec.: … he solved it. Granted that R. Akiba holds, An object intercepted is as at rest, yet perhaps (etc., continuing text as in next paragraph).
4. This objection reverts to Rabbah's answer that our Mishnah agrees with R. Akiba.
5. In the street.
6. A bracket moulding, or anything which projects from the wall of a house; both the house and the projection are private ground.
7. Lit.,'whatever (size) it is'. I.e., very small, less than four square.
8. Which is a projection of the tree.
9. Hence it is private ground, and therefore liability is incurred. — The tree as a whole is regarded, and so we have 'a place four by four.'
10. When the object enters the air space in a private domain, there is 'carrying in' from public to private ground; when it leaves it and re-enters the public domain, there is 'carrying out' from private to public ground. Since the man's act has caused both, he is liable twice over.