Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Yebamoth

Folio 4a

— Because¹  it is written, Thou shalt not wear a mingled stuff …²  Thou shalt make thee twisted cords,³  and R. Eleazar said,⁴  'Whence is the rule of proximity [of texts] derived from the Torah?⁵  As it is said, They are established⁶  for ever and ever, they are done in truth and uprightness.'⁷  Furthermore, R. Shesheth stated⁸  in the name of R. Eleazar who stated it in the name of R. Eleazar b. Azariah: Whence is it proved that a sister-in-law, who falls to the lot of a levir who is afflicted with boils, is not muzzled?⁹  From the Biblical text, Thou shalt not muzzle the ox when he treadeth out the corn,¹⁰  and in close proximity to it is written If brethren dwell together.¹¹  Furthermore R. Joseph said: Even he who does not base interpretations on the proximity [of Biblical texts] anywhere else does base them [on the texts] in Deuteronomy,¹²  for R. Judah who does not elsewhere base any interpretations [on textual proximity], bases such interpretations on the Deuteronomic text.¹³  And whence is it proved that elsewhere he¹⁴  does not advance such interpretation?¹⁵  — From what has been taught: Ben 'Azzai said, It was stated, Thou shall not suffer a sorceress to live,¹⁶  and it is also stated, Whosoever lieth with a beast shall surely be put to death;¹⁷  one subject was placed near the other to indicate that as the man who lies with a beast is to suffer the death penalty of stoning so also is a sorceress to suffer the death penalty of stoning. Said R. Judah to him: Shall we, because one subject was placed in close proximity to the other, lead out a person¹⁸  to be stoned? In truth¹⁹  [the penalty of the sorceress is derived from the following]: The necromancer and the charmer were included among the sorcerers; why then were they mentioned separately?²⁰  In order that the others may be compared to them, and to tell you that as the necromancer and the charmer are subject to the death penalty of stoning,²⁰  so is a sorceress also subject to the penalty of stoning.

And whence is it proved that in Deuteronomy he²¹  does advance such interpretation?¹⁵  — From what we learned: A man may marry a woman who has been outraged or seduced by his father or his son. R. Judah prohibits in the case of a woman outraged or seduced by one's father.²²  And in connection with this, R. Giddal said in the name of Rab: What is R. Judah's reason? Because it is written, A man shall not take his father's wife, and shall not uncover his father's skirt,²³  the 'skirt' which his father saw he shall not uncover. And whence is it inferred that this is written with reference to an outraged woman? — From the preceding section of the text where it is written, Then the man that lay with her shall give unto the damsel's father fifty shekels of silver²⁴  near which it is stated, A man shall not take etc.²⁵  And the Rabbis?²⁶  — If one text had occurred in close proximity to the other the exposition would have been justified;²⁷  now, however, that it does not occur in close proximity²⁸  [it must be concluded that] the context speaks of a woman who is awaiting the decision of the levir²⁹  and that, [in marrying such a woman, a son]³⁰  transgresses two negative precepts.³¹

And what is the reason why [R. Judah] derives laws [from the proximity of texts] in Deuteronomy? — If you wish I might say: Because [there the deduction]³²  is obvious; and if you prefer I might say: Because [there the text] is superfluous.³³  'If you prefer I might say: Because [there the deduction] is obvious', for, otherwise,³⁴  the All Merciful should have written the prohibition in the section of forbidden relatives. 'And if you prefer I might say: Because [there the text] is superfluous', for otherwise³⁵  the All Merciful should have written, A man shall not take his father's wife.²⁵  what need was there for adding,³⁶  And shall not uncover his father's skirt?²⁵

1. This is an answer to the second question. The first is answered infra 5b.
2. Deut. XXII, 11.
3. Ibid. 12.
4. V. Ber. 10a.
5. Heb. Semukim [H] (rt. [H] 'to join'); i.e., the exegetical principle that we deduce laws from the proximity of Biblical texts.
6. 'Semukim'.
7. Ps. CXI, 8. The proximity of the two texts (Deut. XXII, 11 and 12) may consequently be taken to indicate that though the wearing of mingled stuff (linen and wool) is forbidden in ordinary cases (Deut. XXII, 11) it is nevertheless permitted in the case of the performance of a positive precept such as that of the making of 'twisted cords' or zizith (v. Glos.) on the four corners of a garment (ibid. v. 12).
8. Mak. 23a.
9. I.e., she is not prevented from objecting to the levirate marriage, and is entitled to halizah. 'Muzzled' (rt. [H]) is taken from Deut. XXV, 4 from which this law is derived.
10. Deut. XXV, 4.
11. Ibid. v. 5, forming the introduction to the law of halizah. Thus it has been shewn that a law may be based on the proximity of Biblical texts, and this confirms the conclusion in respect of 'mingled stuff' in zizith (v. Deut. XXII, 11).
12. Where the texts of 'mingled stuff' and zizith occur.
13. Ber. 21b. Cf. Pes. 67b.
14. R. Judah.
15. Interpretations based on semukim or proximity of texts.
16. Ex. XXII, 17.
17. Ibid. 18.
18. Lit., 'this' sc. the sorceress.
19. Lit., 'but'.
20. V. Lev. XX, 27.
21. R. Judah.
22. Ber. 21a, infra 97a.
23. Deut. XXIII, 1.
24. Deut. XXII, 29.
25. Deut. XXIII, 1.
26. Represented by the view of the first Tanna who differs from R. Judah. How do they, in view of R. Judah's exposition, allow the marriage of a woman outraged or seduced by one's father?
27. Lit., 'as you said'.
28. Cur. edd. contain within parentheses: 'Since the text, A man shall not take his father's wife is written between them'.
29. Whether he will marry her or consent to halizah.
30. Of the levir for whose decision the woman is waiting.
31. Infra 97a. One is that of marrying a woman who is virtually his father's wife being subject still to the levirate marriage, and the other is that of marrying an aunt, the wife of his father's deceased brother.
32. From the proximity of the texts.
33. Lit., 'free', 'disengaged'. i.e., unnecessary for the contexts and consequently free for interpretation and exposition.
34. Lit., 'if so', i.e., if the text was meant to convey its plain meaning only.
35. Cf. previous note.
36. Lit., 'wherefore to me'.

Hence it must be concluded that the text was meant to provide a superfluous text.¹

Similarly in the case of zizith,²  if you wish I might reply:³  Because [there⁴  the deduction] is obvious. And if you prefer I might reply:⁵  Because [there⁶  the text] is superfluous.⁷  'If you prefer I might say: Because [there the deduction] is obvious', for otherwise,⁸  the All Merciful should have written [the precept] in the section of zizith;⁹  with what other practical rule in view has he written it here?¹⁰  'And if you prefer, I might reply: Because [there the text] is superfluous', for observe: It is written, Neither shall there come upon thee a garment of two kinds of stuff mingled together.¹¹  What need then was there for stating, Thou shalt not wear a mingled stuff?¹²  Hence it must be concluded that the object was to provide a superfluous text.¹³

But [surely] both these texts¹⁴  are required? For if the All Merciful had only written, Neither shall there come upon thee¹⁵  it might have been assumed that all kinds of 'putting on' were forbidden by the All Merciful, even that of clothes dealers,¹⁶  hence the All Merciful, has written, Thou shalt not wear a mingled stuff,¹⁷  [shewing that the 'putting on' must be] of the same nature as that of wearing for personal comfort. And if the All Merciful had only written, Thou shalt not wear¹⁸  it might have been assumed that only wear [is forbidden] because the pleasure derived therefrom is great, but not mere 'putting on', hence the All Merciful has written, Neither shall there come upon thee!¹⁹  — If so,²⁰  the All Merciful should have written, 'Thou shalt not wear a mingled stuff' what need was there for adding, 'Wool and linen'? For²¹  observe: It is written, Neither shall there come upon thee a garment of two kinds of stuff mingled together,¹⁵  and in connection with this a Tanna of the School of R. Ishmael taught: Whereas garments generally²²  were mentioned in the Torah, and in one particular case²³  Scripture specified wool and linen,²³  all must consequently be understood as having been made of wool and linen, what need, then, was there for the All Merciful's specific mention of wool and linen? Consequently it must be concluded that its object was to provide a superfluous text.²⁴

But the text²⁵  is still required [for another purpose]! For it might have been assumed [that the limitation²⁶  applies] only to 'putting on', where the benefit is not great, but that in respect of wear, the benefit from which is great, any two kinds were forbidden by the All Merciful, hence has the All Merciful written, 'wool and linen'!²⁷  — If so, Scripture should have omitted it altogether²⁸  and [the law²⁹  would have been] deduced [by analogy between] 'mingled stuff'³⁰  and 'mingled stuff'³¹  [the latter of which occurs in connection with the law] of 'putting on'.³²

As to the Tanna of the School of R. Ishmael, is the reason [why 'mingled stuff' is permitted in zizith] because the All Merciful has written 'wool and linen', but if He had not done so, would it have been assumed that the All Merciful had forbidden two kinds of stuff in the zizith? But, surely. it is written, And they shall make them fringes in the corners of their garments³³  and a Tanna of the School of R. Ishmael [taught]: Wherever 'garment' [is written] such as is made of wool or flax [is meant], and yet the All Merciful said that in them 'purple' shall be inserted, and purple, surely, is wool. And whence is it deduced that purple is wool? Since linen³⁴  is flax, purple must be wool.³⁵  — [The text] was necessary; for it might have been assumed [that the interpretation is] according to Raba. For Raba pointed out a contradiction: It is written, the corner,³⁶  [which implies that the fringes must be of the same] kind of [material as that of the] corner,³⁷  but then it is also written, wool and linen.³⁸  How then [are these texts to be reconciled?] Wool and linen discharge [the obligation to provide fringes] both for a garment of the same, as well as of a different kind of material, while other kinds [of material]³⁹  discharge [the obligation for a garment made] of the same kind [of material] but not for one made of a different kind [of material].⁴⁰

But the Tanna of the School of R. Ishmael,⁴¹  surely, does not hold the same view as Raba!⁴²  — [The text]⁴³  is still necessary; for it might have been assumed that Raba's line of argument⁴⁴  should be followed: 'The corner' [implies that the fringes must be made of the same] kind of [material as the] corner, and that what the All Merciful meant was this: 'Make wool [fringes] for wool [garments] and linen ones for linen; only when you make wool fringes for wool garments you must dye them'; but no wool fringes may be made for linen or linen fringes for wool, hence the All Merciful has written 'wool and linen' [to indicate] that even wool fringes [may be] made for linen garments or linen fringes for woollen garments.⁴⁵

1. V. supra note 10.
2. V. Glos.
3. To the question why R. Judah expounds semukim in Deuteronomy.
4. In Deuteronomy.
5. To the question why R. Judah expounds semukim in Deuteronomy.
6. In Deuteronomy.
7. V. p. 12, n. 10.
8. Lit., 'if so', i.e., if the text was meant to convey its plain meaning only.
9. V. Glos.
10. None. Consequently it must have been intended for a deduction on the basis of semukim.
11. Lev. XIX, 19.
12. Deut. XXII, 11.
13. V. p. 12, n. 10.
14. Lev. XIX, 19 and Deut. XXII, 11.
15. Lev. XIX, 19.
16. Who put on garments for mere business display or transport and not for bodily comfort or protection.
17. Deut. XXII, 11, emphasis on wear.
18. Ibid.
19. Since both texts, then, are required for the purpose mentioned, how could they be employed for the deduction of a new law?
20. That the texts were required only for the purpose mentioned.
21. Should it be suggested that the text was required to indicate that the 'mingled stuff' forbidden was that of wool and linen.
22. Without specifying the material they are made of.
23. With reference to plagues in garments, Lev. XIII, 47, 48.
24. V. p. 12, n. 10, supra.
25. 'Wool and linen' (Deut. XXII, 11).
26. Of the materials to wool and linen.
27. How, then, could this text which is required for another purpose be expounded on the basis of semukim?
28. Lit., 'kept silence from it'.
29. Which has just been enunciated, i.e., that only wool and linen are forbidden.
30. Deut. XXII, 11.
31. Lev. XIX, 19.
32. As the latter applies to wool and linen only, so also the former.
33. Num. XV, 38.
34. In the description of the materials of the High Priests' garments (Ex. XXXIX, 1ff).
35. As the garments were either of wool or flax, and linen (flax) was specified in the case of one, all the others must have been wool. Now since it has been shewn that purple is wool, it obviously follows that woollen zizith or fringes are permissible in a garment of flax. What was the need, then, for a specific text to prove the permissibility of mingling wool and flax in zizith?
36. Num. XV, 38.
37. I.e., if the material of the corner is wool the fringes must be wool; if of flax the fringes must be of flax.
38. Cf. Deut. XXII, 11f: Mingled stuff, wool and linen thou shalt make the twisted cords, which shews that the fringes may be made either of wool or of flax whatever the material of the corner might be.
39. Silk for instance.
40. So also according to the Tanna of R. Ishmael's school, (as will be explained in the Gemara anon) if Scripture had not specified 'wool and linen' it might have been assumed that in a woollen garment the fringes must be made of wool while in a garment of flax they must be made of flax, hence wool and linen were specified to shew on the basis of semukim that mingled stuffs also are allowed in zizith.
41. At the moment it is assumed that the suggestion is that he is in agreement with Raba's argument in all respects.
42. For, according to him, since 'garment' denotes only such as is made of wool and linen, garments made of other materials require no fringes (zizith). What need, then, was there for the expression of wool and linen to differentiate these from other materials?
43. Wool and linen.
44. Though not his view, applying his method of reasoning only in regard to a garment made of wool or linen.
45. I.e., that mingled stuffs are permissible in the performance of the precept of zizith.