Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Yebamoth

Folio 85a

Behold, however, [the prohibition against] defilement¹  which is a prohibition that is not equally applicable to all²  and [yet the sole] reason [why it is inapplicable to woman is] because the All Merciful wrote The sons of Aaron³  and not the daughters of Aaron; had, however, no such text been available⁴  it would have been assumed that women also come under the same obligation. What is the reason? Obviously⁵  because of the deduction Rab Judah reported in the name of Rab!⁶  — No; this might have been deduced from They shall not take.⁷

Others Say:⁸  [The prohibition in regard] to marrying had to be specified.⁹  Since it might have been assumed that it¹⁰  should be inferred from [that relating to] defilement,¹¹  therefore he taught us¹²  [that women are subject to the same prohibition as men].

R. Papa and R. Huna son of R. Joshua once happened to be at Hinzebu,¹³  the town of R. Idi b. Abin, when the following question was asked of them: Were women of legitimate [priestly] status forbidden to be married to men of tainted birth or not? R. Papa replied, 'You have learned it [in the following]. Ten different genealogical classes went up from Babylon:¹⁴  Priests, Levites, Israelites, halalim,¹⁵  proselytes, emancipated slaves, bastards, nethinim,¹⁶  shethuki¹⁷  and asufi.¹⁷  Priests, Levites and Israelites may intermarry with one another. Levites, Israelites, halalim, proselytes and emancipated slaves may intermarry with one another. Proselytes, emancipated slaves, bastards, nethinim,¹⁶  shethuki¹⁷  and asufi¹⁷  are permitted to intermarry with one another.'¹⁸  That daughters of priests, however, [may be married to a] halal was not mentioned.¹⁹  Said R. Huna son of R. Joshua to him: Only cases where the women may marry the men, and the men may marry the women were enumerated;²⁰  the case of the Priest, however,²¹  was not mentioned, because a halalah, should he even desire to marry one, is forbidden to him.²²  When they came before R. Idi b. Abin he said to them, 'O, school-children! Thus said Rab Judah in the name of Rab: Women of legitimate [priestly] status were not forbidden to be married to men of illegitimate Status'.²³

[IN RESPECT OF] RELATIVES OF THE SECOND GRADE [WHO ARE FORBIDDEN] BY THE ORDINANCES OF THE SCRIBES etc. The men of Bairi²⁴  enquired of R. Shesheth: Is a woman who is of the second grade of kinship to her husband but not to her levir entitled to claim her kethubah from the levir or not? [Do we say that] since a Master said that her kethubah²⁵  is a charge on the estate of her first husband²⁶  she has no [claim upon the levir];²⁷  or, possibly, since the Rabbis have ordained that wherever she is unable to obtain it from her first husband²⁸  [she may collect it] from the second, she²⁹  is entitled to claim it³⁰  [from the levir]? R. Shesheth replied, 'You have learned this: Her kethubah²⁵  is a charge upon the estate of her first husband, but if she was a relative of the second grade of kinship to her husband she receives nothing even from the levir.

Does [the expression,³¹  however,] imply that some [widows] do receive their³⁰  kethubah from the levir!³²  — There is a lacuna, and thus it is the correct reading:³³  Her kethubah²⁵  is a charge upon the estate of her first husband; and if she obtains nothing from the first, the Rabbis have ordained [that she is to receive it] from the second; but if she was a relative of the second grade of kinship to her husband she receives nothing even from the levir.

R. Eleazar enquired of R. Johanan: Is a widow [who was married] to a High Priest, or a divorcee or a haluzah [who was married] to a common priest entitled to maintenance or not? How is this question to be understood? If [it is a case] where she still lives with him,³⁴  would she, when it is his duty to divorce her,³⁵  be entitled to receive maintenance!³⁶  — This question was necessary in the case³⁷  where he went to a country beyond the sea and she borrowed money wherewith to maintain herself;³⁸  it being desired to ascertain³⁹  whether, [owing to the fact that] maintenance³⁹  among the conditions of the kethubah, she is entitled to mainte nance just as she is entitled to the kethubah, or is she entitled to the kethubah only because she receives it and goes, but not to maintenance which might induce her to remain with him? — The other replied: She is not entitled to maintenance.⁴⁰  But, surely, it was taught: She is entitled to maintenance.⁴¹  — That was taught In respect of [alimony] after [her husband's] death.⁴²

Another reading:⁴³  He said to him, 'It was taught: She is entitled to maintenance'.⁴¹  'Surely', [the other asked], 'it is his duty to divorce her!'⁴⁴  'But then', [the first retorted], 'it was taught: She is entitled to maintenance'!⁴¹  — 'That', [the other replied], 'was taught in respect of [alimony] after his death'.⁴²

Our Rabbis taught: A widow [who was married] to a High Priest, or a divorcee or haluzah [who was married] to a common priest is entitled to her kethubah, usufruct,⁴⁵  alimony and worn clothes,⁴⁶  but she becomes thereby unfit, and her child is unfit, and [the husband] is compelled to divorce her. Relatives of the second grade of kinship [who are forbidden] by the ordinances of scribes are entitled neither to kethubah, nor to usufruct,⁴⁵  nor to alimony⁴⁶  nor to worn clothes;⁴⁶  the woman remains fit and her child is fit; but [the husband] is compelled to divorce her. R. Simeon b. Eleazar said, 'Why was it ordained that a widow married to a High Priest is entitled to her kethubah? Because he becomes unfit⁴⁷  and she becomes unfit and wherever he becomes unfit and she becomes unfit⁴⁸

1. For the dead.
2. Having been given to priests only. v. Lev. XXI, 1ff.
3. Ibid. 2.
4. Lit., 'but (if) not so'.
5. Lit., 'not?'
6. Which shews that even a prohibition which is not applicable to all would be assumed to be applicable to women by deduction from Rab's text!
7. Lev. XXI, 7, from which it has been deduced (supra 84b, end) that women are subject to the same prohibitions as men even where the prohibitions are not applicable to all. Hence the necessity for the text of Lev. XXI, 1, which excludes women. From Num. v, 6, however, it may still be maintained, deduction could be made only in respect of a prohibition that is applicable to all.
8. Although the equality of men and women in respect of prohibitions could be deduced from the text cited by Rab Judah in the name of Rab.
9. Lit., 'taking was necessary for him', with reference to the verse, 'They shall not take'.
10. The prohibition of the marriage of the halalah to a halal.
11. Which, as has just been shewn, applies only to men and not to women.
12. In the case of marriage by the text of Lev. XXI, 7.
13. Or 'Shekanzebu' (BaH). The reading 'Shekanzib' (cf. supra 37b) is quoted by Golds., a.l., and rejected in favour of the reading in our text.
14. In the days of Ezra.
15. Pl. of halal, profaned priests. V. Glos.
16. Pl. of nathin, v. Glos.
17. For notes v. supra 37a.
18. Kid. 69a.
19. The answer to their question is, therefore, in the affirmative.
20. Lit., 'wherever these take from those and those take from these he taught'.
21. Though, were he a halal, he would not have been forbidden to marry a priest's daughter.
22. So that the Mishnah of Kid. is not conclusive.
23. V. supra 84b.
24. V. supra p. 561, n. 10. [Here probably Be Bari, south of Sura (v. Obermeyer, p. 308)].
25. Of a widow subject to the levirate marriage.
26. Supra 381, Keth. 80b.
27. Though in this particular case she can have no claim upon the estate of her husband.
28. If, for instance, he is without means.
29. Since here also she receives nothing from the estate of her first husband.
30. Lit., 'there is to her'.
31. 'She receives nothing even from the levir'.
32. Which is contrary to the ruling supra that the kethubah remains a charge upon the estate of the first husband.
33. Lit., 'and thus he taught'.
34. Lit., 'sits under him', her forbidden husband.
35. Lit., 'He stands under (the charge) to get up and make her go out'.
36. Obviously not. What need, then, was there to ask a question the answer to which is so obvious?
37. Lit., 'it is not required (but)'.
38. Lit., 'and she ate'.
39. Lit., 'what'.
40. Lit., 'there is not to her'.
41. Lit., 'there is to her'.
42. If her husband died before she was divorced. Since in such a case there is no cause to apprehend that she will be induced to remain with him, she is entitled to alimony.
43. Lit., 'there is one who says'.
44. Cf. supra p. 574 n. 11. How, then, could he he expected to maintain her?
45. Consumed by the husband from her melog (v. Glos.) property.
46. Cf. nn. on our Mishnah.
47. He is not permitted to perform the Temple service as long as he refuses to part with her. V. Bek. 45b and Git. 35b.
48. [Tosaf.: 'Wherever he becomes unfit or she becomes unfit'. The resulting unfitness of either of them is sufficient to act as a deterrent to the woman in view of the effect it has on the child's fitness. R. Tam, on the other hand, whilst agreeing with this rendering, takes 'he' as referring to the child].

[the Rabbis] have penalized him [by ordering him to pay her] kethubah.¹  And why was it ordained that relatives of the second grade of kinship, [who are forbidden] by the ordinances of the Rabbis, are not to receive their kethubah? Because the man remains fit and the woman remains fit, and wherever he as well as she remains fit [the Rabbis] have penalized her [by depriving her of her] kethubah.²  Rabbi said, 'The former³  are prohibitions⁴  of the Torah, and prohibitions of the Torah require no reinforcement;⁵  while the latter⁶  are prohibitions of the scribes, and the prohibitions of the scribes require reinforcement.⁷  Another reason⁸  is: In the former case the man induces the woman⁹  [into the marriage];¹⁰  in the latter case she induces him.¹¹  Who stated the 'other reason'? One opinion asserts¹²  that it was R. Simeon b. Eleazar who stated it; and he gave an answer¹³  [to the question] 'what is the reason'. 'What is the reason', [he said in effect,] 'why it was ordained that when the man is unfit and the woman is unfit the man is penalized by having to pay the kethubah? Because he induces the woman into the marriage.¹⁴  And what is the reason why when he remains fit and she remains fit she is penalized by losing her kethubah? Because she induces him, [into the marriage'].¹⁵  Another opinion asserts¹²  that it was Rabbi¹⁶  who stated it, because the case of the haluzah presented to him the following difficulty: A haluzah, surely, is only Rabbinically [forbidden to be married to a common priest]¹⁷  and yet she receives her kethubah.¹⁸  Thereupon he stated: Since the man disqualifies her by Rabbinical law¹⁹  it is he, [who in the former case], induces²⁰  her [into marriage]²¹  but in the latter case it is she that induces him [into marriage].²²

What practical difference is there between [the reason given by] Rabbi and [that given by] R. Simeon b. Eleazar? — R. Hisda replied: The practical difference between them is the case of a bastard or a nethinah [who was married] to an Israelite. According to him who gave the reason²³  that [the prohibitions were] Pentateuchal, then this case²⁴  also is Pentateuchal;²⁵  but according to him who gave as the reason,²³  that the man induces the woman²⁶  then here, it is she that induces him [into the marriage].²⁷  According to R. Eliezer, however, who²⁸  stated, 'Behold he²⁹  is both a slave and a bastard',³⁰  the woman, surely, would not induce the man at all!³¹  — Rather, said R. Joseph, the practical difference between them³²  is the case of the man who remarried his divorced wife after she had been married.³³  According to him who gave the reason³⁴  that [the prohibitions were] Pentateuchal, then this case³⁵  also is Pentateuchal;³⁶  but according to him who gave as the reason³⁴  that the man induces the woman³⁷  then here, surely, she induces him.³⁸

But according to R. Akiba who stated that the offspring of a union forbidden under the penalty of a negative precept is deemed to be a bastard,³⁹  she,⁴⁰  surely, would not induce the man at all!⁴¹

Rather, said R. Papal the practical difference between them⁴²  is the case of a be'ulah⁴³  [who was married] to a High Priest.⁴⁴  According to him who gave as the reason³⁴  that [the prohibitions were] Pentateuchal, then this case also is Pentateuchal;⁴⁵  but according to him who gave as the reason³⁴  that the man induces the woman,³⁷  then here, surely, it is she that induces him.⁴⁶

According to R. Eliezer b. Jacob, however, who stated that the offspring of a union that is forbidden under a positive precept is deemed a halal,⁴⁷  she,⁴⁸  surely, would not at all induce him!⁴⁹  Rather, said R. Ashi, the practical difference between them⁴²  is the case of the man who cohabits again with his doubtful sotah.⁵⁰  According to him who stated that the reason³⁴  is that [the prohibition is] Pentateuchal, then this case also is Pentateucha⁴⁶  but according to him who stated that the reason³⁴  is that the man induces the woman³⁷  here it is she that induces him.⁴⁶

And according to R. Mathia b. Heresh who stated that even a woman whose husband, while going to arrange for her drinking [of the water of bitterness]⁵¹  cohabited with her on the way, is rendered a harlot, she,⁵²  surely, would not at all induce him [to such a marriage]!⁵³  Rather, said Mar b. R. Ashi, the practical difference between them⁵⁴  is the case of a confirmed sotah.⁵⁵

MISHNAH. THE DAUGHTER OF AN ISRAELITE WHO WAS BETROTHED TO A PRIEST, WAS PREGNANT FROM A PRIEST, OR WAS AWAITING THE DECISION OF A LEVIR WHO WAS A PRIEST; AND, SIMILARLY, THE DAUGHTER OF A PRIEST [WHO STOOD IN SUCH RELATIONSHIP] TO AN ISRAELITE, MAY NOT EAT TERUMAH.⁵⁶  THE DAUGHTER OF AN ISRAELITE WHO WAS BETROTHED TO A LEVITE, WAS PREGNANT FROM A LEVITE, OR WAS AWAITING THE DECISION OF A LEVIR WHO WAS A LEVITE; AND, SIMILARLY, THE DAUGHTER OF A LEVITE [WHO STOOD IN SUCH RELATIONSHIP] TO AN ISRAELITE MAY NOT EAT TITHE.⁵⁷  THE DAUGHTER OF A LEVITE WHO WAS BETROTHED TO A PRIEST, WAS PREGNANT FROM A PRIEST, OR WAS AWAITING THE DECISION OF A LEVIR WHO WAS A PRIEST; AND, SIMILARLY, THE DAUGHTER OF A PRIEST [WHO STOOD IN SUCH RELATIONSHIP TO A LEVITE, MAY EAT NEITHER TERUMAH NOR TITHE.

GEMARA. And granted that she⁵⁸  is [no more than] an ordinary woman,⁵⁹  is not any ordinary woman permitted to eat tithe?⁶⁰  R. Nahman replied in the name of Samuel: This ruling represents the view of R. Meir⁶¹  who stated: The first tithe is forbidden to common people.⁶²  For it was taught:

1. The woman is already penalized by a marriage which taints both herself and her husband and which is naturally followed by an unhappy family life. In such circumstances the woman would either not consent to marriage or would be anxious to have such a union severed at the earliest possible moment. The penalty was, therefore, imposed upon the husband.
2. In order that she might, in consequence, be deterred from contracting such a marriage or, if contracted, be anxious to have it severed.
3. Lit., 'those', the marriage of a widow to a High Priest and that of a divorcee or haluzah to a common priest.
4. Lit., 'words'.
5. Hence there was no need to deprive the woman of her kethubah. Cf. supra n. 1.
6. Marriages with relatives of the second grade of kinship.
7. Cf. supra n. 1.
8. Why in the former case the man is to pay the kethubah while in the latter the woman loses her kethubah.
9. Lit., '(in) this he leads her'. [H] denom. of [H] 'foot' (cf. Jast.). Colds. (a.l.) renders 'befleckt er sie'.
10. The woman is reluctant to contract a marriage which taints her and her children.
11. As the marriage subjects neither the woman nor her children to any disability, it is assumed that she, as a woman, is more anxious than the man to marry.
12. Lit., 'there is (one) who said'.
13. Lit., 'he said'.
14. V. supra notes 8 and 9.
15. V. supra note 10.
16. Who had previously explained that the reason why the woman was deprived of her kethubah was because prohibitions of the scribes require reinforcement.
17. Cf. Kid. 78a.
18. If Rabbinical prohibitions require reinforcement the haluzah should not have been entitled to her kethubah. (Cf. supra p. 576, n. 2).
19. [ (a) According to Rashi: from eating terumah; (b) MS.M. reads: 'he disqualifies her seed by rabbinic law'. Cf. also Me'iri].
20. V. supra p. 576, n. 8.
21. The woman is reluctant to contract such a union.
22. V. supra p. 576, n. 10.
23. Why in the former case, supra, the woman is entitled to her kethubah.
24. Of the bastard or the nethinah.
25. And the woman is, therefore, entitled to her kethubah.
26. Into the marriage.
27. She, being in any case forbidden to marry an Israelite, has nothing to lose by her marriage which, under certain conditions, may even be advantageous to her, since according to R. Tarfon (cf. Kid. 69a, supra 78a), it may enable her descendants to become proper Israelites. The woman, therefore, loses her kethubah.
28. Disagreeing with the view of R. Tarfon. (Cf. supra n. 11).
29. The son of a union between a bastard and a slave.
30. And can never become a legitimate Israelite. Cf. Kid. 69a.
31. Why then should she lose her kethubah?
32. Rabbi and R. Simeon b Eleazar.
33. After she had been married to another man. V. Rashi and cf. BaH a.l. Cur. edd. read, 'a divorced woman after she had been married'.
34. V. supra p. 57, n. 7.
35. The remarriage of one's divorcee.
36. It is pentateuchally forbidden to marry such a woman. (V. Deut. XXIV, 4). Cf. supra p. 57, n. 9.
37. Into the marriage.
38. Since the prohibition was addressed to the man; and neither the woman nor her children are subject to any disability in consequence of such a marriage.
39. V. supra 49a.
40. The divorced woman who has been married to another man and whose remarriage with her first husband is forbidden by a negative precept.
41. She would not be anxious to contract a union the issue from which would be bastards.
42. Rabbi and R. Simeon b. Eleazar.
43. A woman who has lost her virginity. v. Glos.
44. Such a union is forbidden under the positive precept. A virgin … shall he take (Lev. XXI, 14), and not by a negative one. A negative precept derived from a positive has only the force of a positive. The offspring therefore, would be no bastard even according to R. Akiba.
45. Cf. supra n. 11 and supra p. 57, n. 9.
46. V. supra note 5.
47. V. supra 600.
48. A be'ulah.
49. Since such a marriage would render her child a halal.
50. V. Glos. Such a woman is pentateuchally forbidden to her husband though the offspring of the union is not regarded as a bastard. V. supra 49b.
51. V. Num. V, 18f.
52. The doubtful sotah.
53. Which would render her a harlot and her children bastards.
54. Rabbi and R. Eleazar b. Simeon.
55. Who is Pentateuchally forbidden to her husband though their offspring is not deemed to be a bastard. As she herself is in any case forbidden to marry a priest she has nothing to lose by cohabiting with her husband, and she would consequently persuade him to live with her again. Hence the ordinance that in such a case she loses the rights to her kethubah.
56. As explained supra 67b.
57. Which is the due of the Levites. V. Num. XVIII, 24.
58. The daughter of the Israelite or the Levite who was betrothed etc. to a Levite and an Israelite respectively.
59. [H] (masc. [H]), lit., 'a stranger', not of priestly, or levitical stock.
60. Of course she is. Why, then, does our Mishnah forbid it?
61. Lit., 'this, who is it? It is R. Meir'.
62. Supra 74a. Cf. supra note 1 and p. 579, n. 7.