the payment of doubling.1 IF HE STOLE IT AND CONSECRATED IT [TO THE TEMPLE] AND AFTERWARDS SLAUGHTERED IT OR SOLD IT, HE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE DOUBLE PAYMENT BUT WOULD NOT HAVE TO MAKE FOUR-FOLD AND FIVE-FOLD PAYMENTS. I would here Say: I grant you that he should not be liable for the slaughter, as when he slaughtered it, it was a consecrated animal which he slaughtered and he did not slaughter that which belonged to the owner. But why should he not be made liable for the very act of consecration?2 For indeed what difference does it make to me whether he disposed of it to a private owner or whether he disposed of it to the ownership of Heaven? — This represents the view of R. Simeon who said3 that consecrated objects, the loss of which the consecrator would have to make good, should be considered as if still remaining in the possession of the consecrator.4 But since the concluding clause gives the view of R. Simeon,3 the view stated in the previous clause is surely not that of R. Simeon. [Why then no liability for the act of consecration?] — We must therefore be dealing here with a case of minor sacrifices5 and in accordance with R. Jose the Galilean, who declared6 that minor sacrifices are private property and thus still remain in the possession of the consecrator. But what would be the law [where the thief consecrated the stolen sheep or ox] for most holy sacrifices?7 Would he then have to make four-fold or five-fold payment for the act of consecration? If so, why read in the opening clause: 'If he steals and slaughters and consecrates it, he has to make four-fold or five-fold payment'?8 Why not make the distinction in stating the very case itself: 'This ruling applies only in the case of minor sacrifices, but where he sanctified it for the most holy sacrifices he would have to make four-fold or five-fold payment [for the very act of consecration]'? — We must therefore still say that there is no difference whether [the animal was consecrated for the] most holy sacrifices or merely for minor sacrifices, and to the difficulty raised by you. 'What difference does it make to me whether he disposed of it to a private owner or whether he disposed of it to the ownership of Heaven', [it might be said in answer that] where he disposed of it to a private owner it was previously the ox of Reuben and has now become the ox of Simeon,9 whereas where he disposed of it to the ownership of Heaven it was previously the ox of Reuben and still remains the ox of Reuben.10 R. SIMEON HOWEVER SAYS: IN THE CASE OF CONSECRATED CATTLE THE LOSS OF WHICH THE OWNER HAS TO MAKE GOOD, THE THIEF HAS TO MAKE FOUR-FOLD OR FIVE-FOLD PAYMENT, BUT IN THE CASE OF THOSE THE LOSS OF WHICH THE OWNER HAS NOT TO MAKE GOOD, THE THIEF IS EXEMPT. I would here say: Granted that in the opinion of R. Simeon it makes no difference whether he disposed of it to a private owner or whether he disposed of it to Heaven,11 has not the text to be transposed [so as to read as follows]: '[For consecrating the stolen animals as] sacrifices the loss of which he would have to make good the thief should be exempt, as they have not yet been removed altogether from his possession, whereas [for consecrating them as] sacrifices the loss of which he would not have to make good he should be liable, as in this case they have already been removed from his possession'? It may be said that R. Simeon referred to a different case altogether, and the text [of the Mishnah] is to be read thus: If a man misappropriates an article [already stolen] in the hands of a thief he has not to make four-fold and five-fold payments. So also he who misappropriates a consecrated object from the house of the owner is exempt, the reason being that [the words] 'and it be stolen out of the man's house'12 imply 'but not from the possession of the sanctuary'. R. Simeon, however, says: In the case of consecrated objects, the loss of which the owner has to make good, the thief is liable to pay, the reason being that to this case [the words of the text] 'and it be stolen out of the man's house'12 [apply].13 But in the case of those the loss of which the owner has not to make good, the thief is exempt, as we cannot apply the words 'and it be stolen out of the man's house'. Let us see. We have heard R. Simeon say14 that a slaughter through which the animal would not ritually become fit for food could not be called slaughter [in the eye of the law]. Is the slaughter [outside the Temple precincts] of sacrifices not similarly a slaughter which would not render the animal fit for food?15 [Why then should there be liability for slaughtering them thus?] — When R. Dimi arrived16 he stated on behalf of R. Johanan [that the liability would arise] if the thief slaughtered the sacrifices while unblemished within the precincts of the Temple in the name of the owner. But has not the principal thus been restored to the owner [since the sacrifice produced atonement for him]?17 — Said R. Isaac b. Abin: We presume that the blood was poured out [and thus not sprinkled upon the altar, so that no atonement was effected for the owner].18 When Rabin arrived16 he said on behalf of R. Johanan that the liability would only be where he slaughtered the sacrifices while unblemished within the precincts of the Temple but not in the name of the owner,19
Baba Kamma 76bwhereas Resh Lakish said that there will be liability also if the thief slaughtered blemished sacrifices1 outside the precincts of the Temple.2 R. Eleazar was astonished at the statement of R. Johanan: Is it the slaughter that renders the sacrificed animal permissible for food?3 Is it not the sprinkling of the blood that renders it permissible to be partaken of?4 So also he was astonished at the statement of Resh Lakish: Is it the slaughter that renders the sacrificed animal permissible for food?5 Is it not its redemption6 that renders it permissible for food?5 — It, however, escaped his memory that R. Simeon has laid down that whatever is ready to be sprinkled is considered as if it has already been sprinkled, and whatever is designated for being redeemed is considered as if it had already been redeemed.7 'Whatever is ready to be sprinkled is considered as if it had already been sprinkled' — as taught: R. Simeon says: There is nothar8 which may be subject to defilement in accordance with the law applicable to the defilement of food,9 but there is also nothar which is not subject to defilement in accordance with the law applicable to the defilement of food. How is this so? If it remains over night before the sprinkling of the blood,10 it would not be subject to become defiled in accordance with the law applicable to the defilement of food,11 but if after the sprinkling of blood,12 it would be subject to become defiled in accordance with the law applicable to the defilement of food.13 Now, it is an accepted tradition that the meaning of 'before sprinkling' is 'without it first having become fit to be sprinkled' and of 'after sprinkling', 'after it became fit for sprinkling'. Hence, 'where it remained overnight without having first become fit for sprinkling' could only be where there was no time during the day to sprinkle it, such as where the sacrifice was slaughtered close upon sunset, in which case it would not be subject to become defiled in accordance with the law applicable to the defilement of food; and 'where it remained over night after it had already become fit for sprinkling,' [could only be] where there was time during the [previous] day to sprinkle it, in which case it would be subject to become defiled in accordance with the law applicable to the defilement of food.14 This proves that whatever is ready to be sprinkled is considered as if it had already been sprinkled.15 'Whatever is designated for being redeemed is considered as if it had already been redeemed,' — as taught: 'R. Simeon says: - To Next Folio -
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