Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Baba Mezi'a

Baba Mezi'a 95a

unless the verse had explicitly stated 'together'!¹  — You may say so even according to R. Joshia: it [sc. 'or'] is unnecessary here for the purpose of separation. Why? It is a matter of logic: what is the difference whether it is wholly killed or only partly?²

Whence do we know that a borrower is responsible for theft and loss? And should you say, It follows from injury and death: [I would rejoin,] as for these, [he is responsible] because it is impossible to take the trouble of finding it again;³  will you then say [the same] in the case of theft and loss, seeing that with trouble it may be found?⁴  — But [it may be derived] even as it has been taught: [And if a man borrow aught of his neighbour,] and it be hurt, or die — from this I know [the law] only for injury and death: whence do I know it for theft and loss? — You can reason a minori: if a paid bailee, who is not responsible for injury and death, is nevertheless liable for theft and loss; then a borrower, who is liable for the former, is surely liable for the latter too! And this is an a minori argument which cannot be refuted. Why state that it 'cannot be refuted'?⁵  — For should you object, It may be refuted, thus: as for a paid bailee, [he is responsible for theft and loss] because he must make restitution of twice the principal [if discovered] in a [false] plea of [loss through] an armed robber,⁶  [I would reply,] yet notwithstanding, the fact that the borrower is responsible for the principal⁷  is a greater severity. Alternatively, he maintains that an armed robber is a gazlan.⁸

We have thus learned⁹  responsibility;¹⁰  whence do we know freedom from liability?¹¹  And should you say, It is deduced from injury and death: [it might be argued,] as for these, [he is free] because they are unavoidable accidents? — But it follows from a paid bailee. And whence do we know it of a paid bailee himself? — The liability of a paid bailee is equated to that of a borrower: just as there, when the owner is lent for personal service, he [sc. the borrower] is free thereof, so here too [in the case of a paid bailee], when the owner is lent for personal service, he is free thereof. How is this deduced? If by analogy,¹²  that may be refuted, as [in fact] we have refuted it, since they [sc. injury etc.] are accidents!¹³  — But Scripture saith, 'And if a man borrow': the waw [copulative 'and'] indicates conjunction with¹⁴  the preceding subject, and the upper section is determined by the lower.¹⁵  But even so, [the law of] a borrower cannot be deduced from [that of] a paid bailee, since it [the similarity] may be refuted. As for a paid bailee, that [sc. his non-liability for theft when the owner is in his service] is because he is exempt in the case of injury and death: will you say the same of a borrower, who is liable for these? — But [reason this]: Whence do we know that a borrower is liable for theft and loss [at all]? [Is it not] because we deduce it from a paid bailee?¹⁶  Then it is sufficient that the conclusion of an a minori proposition shall be as its premise: just as theft and loss in the case of a paid bailee, when the owner is in his service, impose no liability; so also with respect to theft and loss in the case of a borrower, when the owner is in his service there is no responsibility. Now, that is well on the view that we accept this limitation;¹⁷  but on the view that rejects it, what can you say? — But [answer thus]: Scripture saith, 'And if a man borrow': the 'waw' indicates conjunction with the preceding subject, and so the lower section illumines the upper and is itself illumined thereby.¹⁸

It has been stated: When there is culpable negligence [on the part of an unpaid bailee], and the owner is in [his service] — R. Aha and Rabina dispute therein: One maintains that he is liable; the other that he is exempt. He who rules that he is liable maintains that a Scriptural verse may be interpreted [as applying] to the immediately preceding subject, but not to the one anterior thereto: consequently, But if the owner thereof be with it, etc.,¹⁹  does not refer to a gratuitous bailee;²⁰  on the other hand, negligence [as a cause of liability] is not stated in connection with a paid bailee and a borrower. Therefore, liability [for negligence] in the case of the paid bailee and borrower too follows a minori from a gratuitous bailee. But that there should be no liability for it, when the owner is in their service, that cannot be maintained even in respect of a paid bailee and a borrower.²¹  Why so? Because when Scripture states in respect of a borrower and a paid bailee,²²  But if the owner thereof be with it, he shall not make it good, it refers only to those cases of liability which are explicitly stated.²³  Whilst he who maintains that he is not responsible, is of the opinion that the verse may be interpreted as bearing upon the preceding subject and the one anterior thereto; hence, when it is stated, But if the owner thereof [etc.], it refers to a gratuitous bailee too.

We learnt: IF A MAN BORROWS A COW AND BORROWS ITS OWNER WITH IT, OR BORROWS A COW²⁴  AND HIRES THE OWNER WITH IT, OR IF HE FIRST BORROWS OR HIRES THE OWNER AND THEN BORROWS THE COW, AND IT DIES, HE IS NOT RESPONSIBLE. But a gratuitous bailee is not mentioned!²⁵  — But even on your reasoning, is then a paid bailee mentioned?²⁶  Hence [it must be said,] the Tanna states [only] what

1. I.e., the waw implies both conjunction and separation, and in the absence of an explicit statement to the contrary it is assumed to connote separation. v. Sanh. 85b. Hence, in his view the 'or' is unnecessary, and may teach the inclusion of capture; but in R. Joshia's view it is necessary, and so the question remains.
2. For an injury is the equivalent of partial death, with respect to the value of the animal.
3. I.e., the loss is absolute.
4. Hence it may be argued that the owner must seek them, and the borrower is free from liability.
5. The emphatic assertion suggests that the Tanna has a particular refutation in mind, but maintains that it is false.
6. V. supra. The same holds good here.
7. When he really is attacked by an armed robber.
8. Lit., 'robber', who robs by open violence and is not subject to the twofold payment (v. B.K. 79b), as distinct from gannab, a thief who steals in secret. Consequently, the punishment of twofold payment does not apply to a paid bailee who falsely pleads an attack by an armed robber.
9. Lit., 'found'.
10. I.e., that a borrower is responsible for theft and loss.
11. In the case of theft or loss, when the owner of the bailment has lent his personal service too.
12. [H] Lit., 'what (do) we find?' i.e., as we find a paid bailee and a borrower responsible for certain mishaps, and we also find that the former ceases to be responsible when the owner of the bailment is personally in his service, so the same is assumed of the latter.
13. Whereas theft is not so unpreventable.
14. Lit., 'adds to'.
15. [H]. I.e., the waw indicates that the provisions of each section, in part at least, apply to the other. Hence, since the lower states that a borrower is exempt when the owner lends his personal service, the same holds good in the upper section dealing with a paid trustee.
16. As stated supra.
17. Lit., 'that agrees (that we say), Dayyo, it is sufficient.' v. B.K. 25a.
18. Hence, just as a borrower is free from responsibility when the owner is in his service, where he would otherwise be liable, sc. for injury and death, so the paid bailee is free in similar circumstances where he would otherwise be liable, viz., for theft and loss. And just as a paid bailee is not responsible in these cases, so likewise a borrower. Now, since the whole is thus deduced by analogy, it is not subject to refutation. But above, only the first half was deduced by analogy (hekkesh, v. Glos.), the second half being derived a minori; and an a minori reasoning (Kal wa-homer, v. Glos.) is subject to refutation.
19. Mentioned in the case of borrower.
20. Which is two sections remote from the borrower.
21. Notwithstanding that in cases of mishaps this fact does free them from liability.
22. The first explicitly, and the second by exegesis.
23. But not for negligence, the liability for which is derived a minori.
24. [This phrase does not occur in our Mishnah but is introduced by the Talmud in the text to exclude the possible assumption that the reference here is to the hiring of the cow. V. Strashun, a.l.]
25. Which proves that the service of the owner does not free him where he would otherwise be responsible, viz., in the case of culpable negligence, thus refuting the contrary view.
26. Though all agree that he is exempt from his liabilities if the owner is in his service.

is explicitly written, and not what is exegetically derived.

Come and hear: If he borrows it [sc. the animal], and borrows its owner along with it; if he hires it and hires the owner with it; if he borrows it, and hires the owner along with it; or if he hires it and borrow its owner with it; even if the owner is working elsewhere,¹  and it dies, he is not liable. Now, it was assumed that this Tanna agrees with R. Judah that a hirer ranks as a paid bailee: thus we see that this Tanna includes what is derived exegetically, yet omits an unpaid trustee! — This agrees with R. Meir, who maintains that a hirer ranks as a gratuitous trustee; and so he states [the law] of an unpaid bailee, and the same applies to a paid bailee. If you wish,²  I can say it is as Rabbah b. Abbuha reversed [the dispute] and taught: How does a hirer pay? R. Meir said, As a paid bailee; R. Judah said, As an unpaid bailee.³

R. Hamnuna said: He is always responsible unless it [the bailment] be a cow, and he [its owner] ploughs therewith [in the bailee's service], or an ass, and he drives it along, and unless the owner is in the bailee's service from the time the loan is made until it is injured or dies. Thus we see that in his view, 'But if the owner thereof be with it,' refers to the whole transaction.⁴

Raba raised an objection: If he borrows it [sc. the animal], and borrows its owner along with it; if he hires it and hires the owner with it; if he hires it and borrows its owner with it; or if he borrows it and hires the owner along with it; even if the owner is working elsewhere, and it dies, he is not liable. Surely, that means on different work!⁵  — No; it means on the same work [as the animal was doing]. Then how can it be elsewhere? — [It means] that he went along breaking up [the ground] ahead of it. But since the second clause refers to [working] near it, it follows that the first clause means [actually] a different work! For the second clause states: If he [first] borrows it [sc. the animal] and then borrows its owner; if he hires it and then hires its owner with it, even if the owner is ploughing at its side, and it perishes, he [the borrower or hirer] is responsible! — I will tell you: Both the first clause and the last refer to the same work; and the first clause teaches something of noteworthy interest, and the second likewise. The first clause teaches something of noteworthy interest: though he [the owner] is actually by its side, but yet engaged on the same work, since the owner was in his service from the time the loan was made, he [the bailee] is not responsible. And the second likewise teaches us something of noteworthy interest: though he [the owner] is by its side, yet since the owner was not in his service from the time of the loan, he is responsible. How so? Now, if you concede that the first clause refers to different work and the second to the same, it is well: that very fact is remarkable.⁶  But if you suggest that both the first clause and the second refer to the same work, what is there remarkable? Both⁷  are on the same work!⁸  And moreover it has been taught:⁹  From the verse, But if the owner thereof be with it, he shall not make it good, do I not know, by implication, that if the owner thereof is not with it, that he must make it good? Why then is it [explicitly] stated, And the owner thereof not being with it, [he shall surely make it good]? To teach you: if he is in his service when the loan is made, he need not be so at the time of injury or death; but though in his service at the time of injury or death, he must also have been so with him at the time of loan.¹⁰  And another [Baraitha] further taught:⁸  From the verse, The owner thereof being not with it, he shall surely make it good, do I not know by implication, that if the owner thereof is in his service, that he is free from liability? Why then is it stated, But if the owner thereof be with it [etc.]? To teach you: Once it [the animal] has left the lender's possession, its owner being [simultaneously] in his service, even for a single hour, and it dies, he [the borrower] is free from liability.¹¹  The [complete] refutation of R. Hamnuna is indeed unanswerable.¹²

Abaye, holding with R. Joshia, explains the verses in accordance with him; Raba, agreeing with R. Jonathan, interprets them on the basis of his views.¹³  [Thus:] 'Abaye, holding with R. Joshia, explains the verses in accordance with him,' 'The owner thereof being not with it, he shall surely make it good': hence, it is only because he was not with him on both occasions;¹⁴  but if he were with him on one occasion but not on the other, he would be free from responsibility.¹⁵  But [on the Other hand], it is written, 'But if the owner thereof be with it he shall not make it good': hence, it is only because he was with him on both occasions, but if he was with him on one occasion but not on the other, he is responsible. [This contradiction is] to teach you: If he was with him at the time of the loan, he need not have been with him at the time of the injury or death; but though he were with him at the time of the injury or death he must also have been with him when the loan was made.¹⁶

1. I.e., not in the same place as the animal, yet in the service of the borrower or hirer.
2. [Should you for some reason prefer to ascribe this anonymous Baraitha to R. Judah (Rashi).]
3. According to this, the Baraitha is taught on the basis of R. Judah's views.
4. I.e., the owner must be in the borrower's service all the time, and employed on the labour done with the borrowed ox or ass.
5. This refutes R. Hamnuna.
6. That though he is free from responsibility when the owner is in his service even for different work, he is nevertheless liable if he is not in service from the very beginning, even if engaged on the same work at the time of death.
7. Whether he breaks up the ground before it, or guards it from behind.
8. And thus there stands Raba's cited objection to R. Hamnuna.
9. In refutation of R. Hamnuna's ruling.
10. This proves that 'and the owner thereof not being with it' refers directly to the time of the loan, and not as R. Hamnuna holds, to the whole time of the transaction.
11. This Baraitha is identical with the preceding and differs only in form.
12. The first part of his statement from the first teaching, and the latter from the last two Baraithas cited.
13. For the dispute of R. Joshia and R. Jonathan, v. supra 94b. The Talmud now explains how the Tannaim deduce that the owner must be pledged to the borrower's service at the time of the loan, but not when the injury or death occurs.
14. Of the loan and the injury or death.
15. Since the beginning of the verse mentions both the loan and the mishap, the second half, the owner thereof etc., must refer to both likewise, i.e., the owner was not with him when he borrowed, nor when it died. That is the natural interpretation according to R. Joshia's view that the waw is definitely conjunctive, so that (and it die) links the whole verse.
16. It is explained below why this is assumed, and not the reverse.