Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Gittin

Folio 83a

that he permits what he had forbidden, if he says only 'To Reuben',¹  what is to be done? Do we take the words 'To Reuben' to apply also to Simeon, presuming that why he now says Reuben is because he had been mentioned first, or does he mean Reuben and Reuben only? And assuming that he means Reuben only, if he says 'To Simeon' what is to be done? Do we take the words 'To Simeon' to apply to Reuben also, presuming that why he now says Simeon is because he had just mentioned him, or does he mean Simeon and Simeon only? R. Ashi asked,²  If he said, Also to Simeon, what are we to do? Do we take 'also' to mean 'besides Reuben', or 'besides everyone else' [but not Reuben]? — These questions are left undecided.

Our Rabbis taught: After the demise of R. Eliezer, four elders came together to confute his opinion. They were R. Jose the Galilean, R. Tarfon, R. Eleazar b. Azariah, and R. Akiba. R. Tarfon argued as follows:³  Suppose this woman went and married the brother of the man to whom she had been forbidden and he died without children, would not the first be found to have uprooted an injunction from the Torah?⁴  Hence you may conclude that this is no 'cutting off'.⁵  R. Jose the Galilean then argued as follows: Where do we find the same thing should be forbidden to one and permitted to another? What is forbidden is forbidden to all alike and what is permitted is permitted to all alike. Hence we may conclude that this is no 'cutting off'. R. Eleazar b. Azariah then argued as follows: 'Cutting off' means something which completely cuts him off from her. Hence you may conclude that this is no cutting off'. R. Akiba then argued as follows: Suppose this woman went and married some other man and had children from him and was then widowed or divorced from him, and she afterwards went and married this man to whom she had been forbidden, would not her original Get have to be declared void and [consequently] her children bastards? From this we conclude that this is no cutting off'. Or alternatively I may argue: Suppose the man to whom she was forbidden was a priest and the man who divorced her died, then in respect of the priest she would be a widow⁶  and in respect of all other men a divorcee.⁷  There then follows an argument a fortiori: Seeing that she would have been forbidden to the priest qua divorcee, though this involves but a minor [transgression],⁸  should she not all the more as a married woman, which is a much more serious affair,⁹  be forbidden to all men?¹⁰  From this we may conclude that this is no 'cutting off'. R. Joshua said to them: You should not seek to confute the lion after he is dead.¹¹  Raba said: All these objections can be countered except that of R. Eleazar b. Azariah, in which there is no flaw. It has been taught to the same effect: R. Jose said: I consider the argument of R. Eleazar b. Azariah superior to all the others.

The¹²  Master said above: R. Tarfon argued thus: Suppose she went and married the brother of the man to whom she was forbidden and he died without children, would not the first be found to have uprooted an injunction from the Torah? Uprooting, [you say]? He uprooted?¹³  — You should read, He stipulates to uproot an injunction from the Torah. He stipulates? Is there any word about it? Can she not do without marrying the brother of that man? — You should read, He may possibly cause an injunction to be uprooted from the Torah. But in that case a man should be forbidden to marry his brother's daughter, since perhaps he will die without children and he will thus cause an injunction to be uprooted from the Torah?¹⁴  — This is the flaw in the argument. In what case then [does R. Tarfon assume R. Eliezer to differ from the Rabbis]? Is it where the husband says 'except'? In that case R. Eliezer would allow her to marry him,¹⁵  as it has been taught: 'R. Eliezer agreed that if a man divorced his wife Saying to her, You are hereby permitted to any man except So-and-so, and she went and married some other man and was widowed or divorced, she is permitted to marry the man to whom she had been forbidden.' It must be therefore where he says 'on condition'.¹⁶

'R. Jose the Galilean argued as follows: Where do we find that the same thing should be forbidden to one and permitted to another? What is forbidden is forbidden to all and what is permitted is permitted to all'. Is that so? What of terumah and holy meats which are forbidden to one class¹⁷  and permitted to another?¹⁸  — We are speaking of sexual prohibitions. But what of forbidden degrees of consanguinity? — We speak of marriage. But there is the case of a married woman?¹⁹  — This is the flaw in the argument. In what case then [does R. Jose assume R. Eliezer to differ from the Rabbis]? Is it where he says 'on condition' [that you do not marry So-and-so]? She is permitted to him in the way of fornication!²⁰  — It must be then where he says 'except'.²¹

'R. Akiba argued as follows: Suppose she went and married some other man and had children from him and was then widowed or divorced and she went and married the man to whom she had been forbidden, would not her original Get have to be declared void and her children bastards?' If that is so, then wherever there is a condition in the Get she should not marry, for fear lest she should not fulfil the condition and the Get would prove to be void and her children bastards. This is the flaw in the argument. In what case then [does R. Akiba suppose R. Eliezer to differ from the Rabbis]? It cannot be where he says 'except', because there R. Eliezer permits her, as it has been taught, 'R. Eliezer agrees that if a man divorced his wife saying to her, You are hereby permitted to any man except So-and-so, and she went and married some other man and became widowed or divorced, she is permitted to the man to whom she was originally forbidden'?²²  — It must be therefore if he says 'on condition'. 'Alternatively [R. Akiba argued]: Suppose the man to whom she was forbidden was a priest and the man who divorced her died, then she would be a widow in respect of the priest and a divorcee in respect of all other men. There thus follows an argument a fortiori. Seeing then that she would be forbidden to the priest qua divorcee, though this involves but a minor [transgression], should she not all the more as a married woman, which is a much more serious affair, be forbidden to all men'. In what case then [does R. Akiba assume R. Eliezer to have differed from the Rabbis]? Is it where he says 'on condition'?

1. To supplement his first statement.
2. On the assumption that in the last case he means 'to Simeon only'.
3. Lit., 'answered and said'.
4. Because now she cannot fulfil the law of the levirate marriage.
5. V. supra p. 83.
6. Because as far as he went she had never been divorced.
7. And consequently still forbidden to the priest, since she had at any rate been divorced from her husband. V. supra.
8. The marriage of a divorcee to a priest involves the breach of an ordinary prohibition which carries with it no death penalty.
9. Involving, as it does, the penalty of death.
10. In virtue of this peculiar divorce, she becomes at the time of divorce on one side a divorcee in respect of men in general, while on the other side she remains a married woman in respect of the priest. Seeing that the divorced side was sufficient to prohibit her to the priest, should not the married side be sufficient to prohibit her to all other men?
11. As much as to say, If R. Eliezer had been alive, he could have found answers to your objections.
12. The flaws in the objections are now pointed out.
13. That is to say, he has done nothing positive to this effect.
14. Because the widow cannot possibly marry the husband's brother.
15. Viz., the divorcee to marry the brother of the second husband, in the case put by R. Tarfon, so that there would be no point in his objection.
16. Where failure to fulfill the condition renders the Get void.
17. Laymen.
18. Priests.
19. Who is permitted to her husband and forbidden to others.
20. And therefore there is no point in his objection.
21. Which forbids her to the said man also in the way of fornication.
22. And so there is no point in R. Akiba's objection.

In that case she is for purposes of fornication a divorcee in respect of him?¹  — It must be therefore where he says 'except'. Now if R. Akiba [thought that the difference is where he says] 'except', why did he not bring [merely] the objection which applied to that case,²  and if [he thought that it was where he says] 'on condition', why does he not bring [merely] the objection applying to that case?³  — R. Akiba had heard one report according to which R. Eliezer said 'except', and another according to which he said 'on condition'. For the version which gave 'except' he had one objection, and for the version which gave 'on condition' he had another objection. And what is the flaw [in the second objection of R. Akiba]? We cannot say it is that the prohibition of her marrying a priest is on a special footing,⁴  because R. Eliezer also bases his ruling⁵  on the priestly prohibition?⁶  — Raba follows the version which R. Jannai gave in the name of a certain elder.⁷

'R. Joshua said to them, You should not seek to confute the lion after he is dead.' This would imply that R. Joshua concurred with him. But how can this be, seeing that he himself also brought an objection against him?⁸  — What he meant was this: I also have objections to bring, but whether for me or for you, it is not fitting to seek to confute the lion after he is dead. What was the objection of R. Joshua? — As it has been taught: R. Joshua said: Scripture compares her status before the second marriage to the one before the first marriage.⁹  Just as before the first marriage she must not be tied to any other man, so before the second marriage she must not be tied to any other man.

[To revert to] the above text: 'R. Eliezer agreed that if a man divorced his wife saying to her, You are permitted any man except So-and-so, and she went and married some other man and became widowed or divorced, she is then permitted to marry the man to whom she was at first forbidden.' R. Simeon b. Eleazar argued against R. Eliezer's view, saying, Where do we find that what one man renders forbidden can be made permissible by another?¹⁰  But are there no such cases? Is there not that of the sister-in-law who is rendered forbidden¹¹  by the husband and permissible by the brother-in-law?¹²  — In that case it is really the brother-in-law who makes her forbidden, since as far as the husband is concerned she is permitted.¹³  But what of vows, where the one who makes the vow forbids and the wise man permits?¹⁴  — [This is not really so], as R. Johanan has said that the wise man does not release except where there is a change of mind.¹⁵  But there is the husband's power of disallowing, since the wife vows but the husband disallows?¹⁶  — The answer to that is provided by what R. Phineas said in the name of Raba; for R. Phineas said in the name of Raba: A woman who makes a vow always does so subject to the consent of her husband.

'R. Eleazar b. Azariah argued as follows: "Cutting off"17 means something that cuts him off from her. From this we conclude that this is not "cutting off".' What do the [other] Rabbis¹⁸  make of this 'cutting off'? — They require it for the ruling contained in the following, as had been taught: '[If a man says], This is your Get on condition that you never drink wine, on condition that you never go to your father's house, this is not "cutting off".¹⁹  [If he says], For thirty days, this is "cutting off".' And the other [R. Eleazar]? — We can learn this, [he says,] from the use of the form kerithuth in place of kareth.²⁰  And the Rabbis? — They do not stress the difference between kareth and kerithuth.²¹

Raba said: [If a man said,] This is your Get on condition that you do not drink wine all the days of my life, this is no 'cutting off', but if he said, All the days of So-and-so's life, this is 'cutting off'. Why this difference? [If you say that where he says] 'the life of So-and-so', it is possible that he may die and she may fulfil the condition, [I may rejoin that where he says] 'my life', there is also a possibility that he may die and she may fulfil the condition? — We should read therefore, [If he says,] All the days of your life,²²  this is no 'cutting off', but if he says, All the days of my life or of So-and-so's life, this is cutting off'.

Raba put the following question to R. Nahman: [If he says], To-day you are not my wife, but to-morrow you will be my wife, what is to be done? The answer is not clear whether we accept the view of R. Eliezer²³  or that of the Rabbis. We ask: If we adopt the view of R. Eliezer, are we to say that in that case R. Eliezer ruled as he did, because as he permitted her she is permitted in perpetuity, but here²⁴  he would not do so, or are we to say that he makes no difference? And we ask, if we adopt the view of the Rabbis, are we to say that in that case the Rabbis ruled as they did because she is not entirely separated from him, but here they would say that once she is separated she is separated?²⁵  Having asked the question he himself answered it:

1. As in respect of all other men, and therefore the a fortiori argument adduced above does not apply.
2. Viz., the first of his objections.
3. Viz., the second of his objections.
4. And therefore we cannot argue from the case where the man to whom she is forbidden is a priest to cases in general.
5. In our Mishnah that the Get is valid as it stands.
6. V. supra, 82b.
7. That R. Eliezer bases his ruling on the text 'and she marry another man', v. supra.
8. V. infra.
9. Because it is written, When a man taketh a wife (Deut. XXIV, 1), referring to the first marriage, and afterwards, and she be another man's wife (ibid. 2), referring to the second marriage.
10. As here, where the first man makes her forbidden to a certain man, and the second renders her permissible, v. Tosef. Git. VII.
11. To all other men.
12. By means of halizah (v. Glos.).
13. As soon as he is dead.
14. By remitting the vow, v. supra 36b.
15. By pointing out the consequences of the vow, so that the one who made it can say, Had I known this I would not have vowed, and the revision renders the vow void retrospectively.
16. The vow, that is to say, is not rendered void, only the husband disallows her observing it; v. Ned, 68a.
17. Deut. XXIV, 1.
18. Viz., R. Tarfon, R. Jose the Galilean and R. Akiba.
19. Because she is tied to him till her death.
20. I.e., the use of the double form where the single would have sufficed implies that another lesson may be learnt in addition to this.
21. V. supra p. 83.
22. V. note 10.
23. Who says in our Mishnah that a substantive reservation in the Get does not necessarily invalidate it.
24. Where the divorce is only for one day.
25. And the condition is worthless.