Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Nazir

Folio 22a

Come and hear: If a woman undertakes a nazirite vow and contracts ritual defilement, and then her husband declares [the vow] void, she is to bring a bird as a sin-offering, but not one as a burnt-offering.²  Now if you suppose that the husband terminates [the vow], she ought also to bring a bird as a burnt-offering?³  — What then would you have us think? That [the husband] nullifies [the vow]? Then she ought not to bring a bird as a sin-offering either?⁴  — That is so. Here, however, we are being given the opinion of R. Eleazar ha-Kappar, for it has been taught: R. Eleazar ha-Kappar Berabbi said: [It may be asked,] Why does Scripture say, [And make atonement for him] for that he sinned by reason of the soul?⁵  For against what soul has he sinned? [The reply is,] however, that because he denied himself wine, he is called a sinner. If then this man who denied himself wine only is called a sinner, how much more so is this true of one who is ascetic in all things!⁶

Come and hear the following where it is taught explicitly: If a woman vows to be a nazirite and her companion overhears and says, 'I too, and then the husband of the first woman declares [her vow] void, she is released [from her vow] but her companion remains bound.⁷  From this it follows that the husband terminates [the vow].⁸  R. Simeon however says⁹  that where [her companion] says to her, 'I undertake the same [obligation] as you,' both become free.

1. Though here it is obvious,
2. A nazirite who contracts defilement must bring one bird as a burnt offering and one as a sin-offering, (cf. Num. VI, 10, 11); v. supra 19a.
3. For the husband does not affect the period before his declaration that the vow is to be void.
4. Since she was not really a nazirite when she violated her vow.
5. For notes v. supra p. 64.
6. Thus she must bring a sin-offering even though the husband nullifies the vow, because she had denied herself wine.
7. Tosef. Naz. III, 5.
8. Continuation of the cited Baraitha.
9. Since otherwise both women should become free together.

Mar Zutra, the son of Rab Mari said: The same problem is raised here as was raised by Rami b. Hama.¹  For Rami b. Hama wished to know the effect of saying, 'Let these [victuals] be, as far as I am concerned, as the flesh of [this] peace-offering.'²  Does a man, in thus linking one thing with another, refer to the original state [of the subject of comparison],³  or to its ultimate state?⁴

But surely [the two cases] do not bear comparison?⁵  For when he says in that case, 'Let these [victuals], as far as I am concerned, be as the flesh of this peace-offering,' [the fact remains that] even though once the blood is sprinkled, this may be eaten outside [the Temple precincts, yet it] is still sacred.⁶  In our case, on the other hand, if we suppose that she has the ultimate state in mind, then the husband [of the first woman] has declared [the vow] void!⁷

Some consider that our problem and that of Rami b. Hama are undoubtedly identical.⁸

If [a woman] says to her [companion], 'I intend to be a nazirite in your wake,'⁹  what would the law be? Does 'in your wake' [mean,] 'I intend to follow in your wake in every respect,' so that she becomes free, or does it refer to her [companion's] condition before her husband declared [the naziriteship] void, so that she remains bound?

Come and hear: If a woman vows to be a nazirite and her husband overhears and adds, 'I too',¹⁰  he cannot declare [her vow] void. Now should you assume that when he says, 'I intend to follow in your wake,'¹¹  he has in mind the original situation,¹²  why should he not be able to declare her [vow] void, whilst allowing his own to remain? Does it not follow, therefore, that what he refers to is the situation with all its developments, and so [it is only when] he himself [is involved that he] cannot declare [the vow] void,¹³  but where [another] woman says, 'I intend to follow in your wake,' she would also be freed?¹⁴  — This is not the case. In point of fact, he may be referring to the original situation, but in this case, when he says, 'I too,' it is as though he says. 'I confirm it for you,' and so if he consults [a wise man] in order to have his ratification upset, he will be able to declare [her vow] void, but not otherwise.

[IF HE SHOULD SAY IN CONVERSATION WITH HIS WIFE,] 'I INTEND TO BE A NAZIRITE, WHAT ABOUT YOU'¹⁵  AND SHE ANSWER' AMEN,' HE CAN DECLARE HER [VOW] VOID, BUT HIS OWN REMAINS BINDING: The following passage seems to contradict this statement. [If a man says to his wife,] 'I intend to be a nazirite. What about you?'¹⁶  if she answers 'Amen,' both become bound [to their vows],¹⁷  but otherwise both are free, because he made his vow contingent on hers?¹⁸  — Rab Judah replied: You should [emend the Baraitha to] read, He can declare her [vow] void, but his own remains binding.

Abaye said: It is even possible to leave the reading intact. The Baraitha supposes him to say to her, 'I intend to be a nazirite with you,' thus making his vow contingent on her vow;¹⁹

1. I.e., whether the vow of the second woman remains binding or not depends, not on the precise force of the husband's declaration that a vow is void, but on the alternatives enunciated by Rami b. Hama.
2. This might not be eaten before its blood was sprinkled on the altar, but could be eaten afterwards.
3. Here, the flesh before the sprinkling of the blood; so that the victuals indicated would also become forbidden. This problem is treated differently in Ned. 11b (q.v.).
4. After the sprinkling of the blood, when the flesh may be eaten. Similarly in the case of the second woman the problem is: — Did she contemplate the original state of the first woman, so that she remains a nazirite, or did she also consider the possibility of the husband declaring the vow void, when her own would also become void. As the Baraitha says that her vow remains binding we may also infer that in Rami b. Hama's case the original state was meant and the victuals are forbidden. The word [H] used to convey the idea of a final state is usually taken from the root meaning 'cold', i.e., 'when it had cooled down'. L. Goldschmidt suggests that it may be derived from a Syriac word 'zenana' meaning the savour of roast meat,' and refers to the time when the flesh is prepared for food.
5. And therefore the solution of the one problem obtained from the Baraitha, does not give the solution of the other.
6. For it may be eaten for a limited period only, viz.: two days and one night (v. Zeb. V, 7), and so the victuals might also be subject to this restriction. Hence whichever of the alternatives enunciated by Rami is adopted, there is a restriction on the victuals.
7. And the vow of the second will not operate. But she must have meant something by the vow, and we are therefore forced to conclude that she had only the original state in mind. Thus the solution of this problem given by the Baraitha affords no clue to the solution of Rami's problem.
8. These do not consider the distinction drawn above decisive, for the woman may have considered it sufficient if she abstained from wine until the husband of the first one declared the vow void, and so once more we have two alternatives.
9. And then the vow of the other is declared void.
10. This is taken to be the same as 'in your wake', for since the husband can declare her vow void and the outcome of her vow is in his power, he would be referring to her ultimate as well as her present state.
11. And all the more if he says, 'I too', to his wife.
12. And he himself is not affected by any change in her vow.
13. Since he would be freeing himself.
14. If the husband annuls the first woman's vow'.
15. Lit., 'I intend … and thou …'
16. Lit., 'I intend … and thou.'
17. But our Mishnah empowers him to declare her vow void,
18. Tosef. Naz. III.
19. Thus he cannot declare her vow void, for he would be nullifying his own at the same time.