Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Niddah

Folio 23a

R. Aha son of Raba taught this³  in the name of R. Eleazar in the direction of leniency. From any gezerah shawah none of whose terms is available for deduction, one may make the deduction and one may also offer a refutation; if one of its terms only is available for the purpose, deduction, according to R. Ishmael, may be made and no refutation may be offered, while according to the Rabbis deduction may be made and a refutation may be offered; and if two of its terms are available for deduction, all agree that deduction may be made and no refutation may be offered. But according to the Rabbis⁴  what is the practical difference between one whose one term is available for deduction and one none of whose terms is available for deduction? — The practical difference between them is the case where you find a gezerah shawah one of whose terms is available for deduction and another none of whose terms is available for the purpose, and neither the one nor the other can be refuted, in such a case we must leave the one neither of whose terms is available and make deduction from the one of which one term is available. But what refutation is there in this case?⁵  — One might object:⁶  A man is different⁷  since he contracts uncleanness⁸  even when he is alive.⁹

R. Hiyya b. Abba citing R. Johanan also stated,¹⁰  This is the reason of R. Meir: Since the expression of 'forming' has been used in its case as in that of man. Said R. Ammi to him: Now then, If an abortion was in the shape of a mountain would the woman who aborted it¹¹  be unclean by reason of the birth because it is said, For, lo, He that formeth¹²  the mountains and createth the wind?¹³  — The other replied: Does she ever abort a mountain? She can only abort something in the shape of a stone, and that can only be described as a lump.¹⁴  But then, if the abortion was some inflated object would the woman who aborted it¹¹  be unclean by reason of the birth because the expression of 'creating' has been used about it as about man, since it is written, And createth¹⁵  the wind?¹³  And should you reply: it¹⁶  is not available for deduction,¹⁷  [it could be retorted:] Since it could have been written, 'Formeth the mountains and the wind', and yet it was written 'And createth the wind' it may be inferred, may it not, that it¹⁶  was intended to be made available for deduction? — The other replied: An analogy for legal purposes may be drawn between words that occur in the Pentateuch¹⁸  but no analogy may be drawn between words that occur respectively in the Pentateuch and in the post-Pentateuchal books.¹⁹

Rabbah²⁰  b. Bar Hana citing R. Johanan stated, This is the reason of R. Meir: Because [the pupils²¹  of] their²²  eyes are similar to those of human beings. Now then, if an abortion was in the likeness of a serpent would the woman who aborted it¹¹  be unclean on account of the birth since its eye-ball is round like that of a human eye? And should you suggest that the law is so indeed [it could be retorted]: Why then was not the serpent mentioned?²³  — If the serpent had been mentioned²³  it might have been presumed that only in the case of the serpent do the Rabbis disagree with R. Meir, since the expression of 'forming' was not written about it but that in the case of a beast or a wild animal they do not differ from him since the expression of 'forming' had been written about it.²⁴  But was it not stated in regard to blemishes,²⁵  'One whose eyeball is like that of a man'?²⁶  — This is no difficulty, the one²⁷  refers to the black of the eye²⁸  while the other refers to the slit.²⁹

R. Jannai stated, This is the reason of R. Meir: Because their³⁰  eyes are fixed in the front of their heads³¹  like those of men. But what about³²  a bird whose eyes are not fixed in the front of its head and R. Meir nevertheless ruled that it is a cause of uncleanness? — Abaye replied: This³³  applies only to the kadia³⁴  and the kipufa.³⁵  It³³  does not then apply to other birds! An objection was raised: R. Hanina b. Gamaliel³⁶  stated, I approve of the view of R. Meir in regard to beasts and wild animals and that of the Sages in regard to birds. Now what did he mean by 'birds'? If it be suggested: kadia³⁴  and kipufa³⁵  [the difficulty would arise]: Wherein do beasts and wild animals differ [from other creatures]? [Obviously in that] that their eyes are fixed in front of their heads like those of men. Now are not those of the kadia³⁴  and the kipufa³⁵  fixed in the same position?³⁷  Consequently³⁸  he must have meant other birds. Thus it may be implied, may it not, that R. Meir differs from the Rabbis in regard to the other birds?³⁹  — Some part is missing⁴⁰  and this is the correct reading: R. Hanina b. Gamaliel³⁶  stated, I approve of the view of R. Meir in regard to beasts and wild animals, this applying also to the kadia and the kipufa; and that of the Sages in regard to other birds; for even R. Meir disagreed with them only in regard to the kadia and the kipufa, but in the case of other birds he agrees with them. And so it was also taught: R. Eliezer son of R. Zadok stated: An abortion that had the shape of a beast or a wild animal is, according to the view of R. Meir, regarded as a valid birth, but according to the view of the Sages it is no valid birth; and in the case of birds an examination should take place. Now according to whose view should an examination take place? Obviously⁴¹  according to that of R. Meir who ruled that the law⁴²  applied⁴³  to the kadia and the kipufa and not to the other birds! R. Aha son of R. Ika retorted: No; the examination should take place according to the Rabbis who ruled that kadia and kipufa are regarded as valid births⁴³  but not other birds. But wherein does the kadia or the kipufa in this respect differ from beasts and wild animals?⁴⁴  — In that they have jaws like those of men.⁴⁵

R. Jeremiah enquired of R. Zera: According to R. Meir who ruled: 'A beast that was in a woman's body is a valid birth', what is the law where its father⁴⁶  received for it a token of betrothal?⁴⁷  — In what respect could this⁴⁸  ever matter? — In respect of causing its sister to be forbidden.⁴⁹  This then presumes⁵⁰  that it is viable! But did not Rab Judah citing Rab state: R. Meir gave his ruling⁵¹  only because in the case of its own species⁵²  it is viable?⁵³  Said R. Aha b. Jacob: 'To such an extent did R. Jeremiah try⁵⁴  to make R. Zera laugh; but the latter did not laugh'.⁵⁵

[Reverting to] the [previous] text, 'Rab Judah citing Rab stated: R. Meir gave his ruling only because in the case of its own species it is viable.' Said R. Jeremiah of Difti:

1. According to the Rabbis.
2. Since such a gezerah shawah, as stated supra, could be refuted.
3. The statement cited supra by Rab Judah.
4. Who maintain that whether one, or none of the terms is available for deduction both deduction and refutation are admissible.
5. The analogy (supra 22b) with man. Sc. since, as was explained supra, the only reason why deduction is made from a gezerah shawah both of whose terms are available for the purpose in preference to one of which one term only is available is the consideration that while the latter can be refuted when a logical refutation is offered the former cannot be refuted even in such a case, it follows that where no refutation can be offered it is immaterial whether the deduction is made from the one or the other. And since R. Meir (supra 22b) preferred the gezerah shawah between man and beast (both of whose terms are available) to that of man and sea-monsters (whose one term only is available) he must have intended to avoid thereby a refutation that had suggested itself to him. Now what was that refutation?
6. Lit., 'because there is (an argument) to refute'.
7. From other creatures.
8. From a dead creeping thing, for instance.
9. Other creatures, however, while alive can never become unclean. It could, therefore, have been argued that man who is subject to the one restriction of uncleanness may also be a cause of uncleanness to his mother when he is born, but any other creature which is not subject to the former restriction is also exempt from the latter.
10. Like Rab Judah, supra 22b.
11. Lit., 'its mother'.
12. An expression of 'forming' like that used of man.
13. Amos IV, 13.
14. To which the term 'mountain' cannot apply.
15. An expression of 'creating' like that used of man.
16. Cf. prev. n.
17. I.e., it is required for its own context.
18. Torah, in its restrictive connotation.
19. Kabalah, lit., 'acceptance', 'tradition' as distinct from Torah. (Cf. prev. n.).
20. Cur. edd. in parenthesis 'he said'.
21. V. Rashi and infra.
22. Beasts.
23. In our Mishnah, among the shapes of creatures that cause the woman's uncleanness.
24. Hence the omission of the serpent.
25. Which disqualify a beast.
26. Bek. 40a. Now since such likeness is regarded as a blemish it is obvious that the normal eye of a beast is different from the human one. How then could R. Johanan maintain that a beast's eyes are like human eyes?
27. R. Johanan's statement.
28. The pupil, which has the same round shape in man and beasts.
29. In which the eye is fixed. This is not so round in the eye of a beast as in the human eye.
30. Beasts'.
31. Lit., 'go before them'. Those of fishes and serpents are fixed in the sides of their heads.
32. Lit., 'and behold'.
33. R. Meir's ruling just cited.
34. Or (as cur. edd.) 'karia', a species of owls.
35. Also a species of owls.
36. Cf. Tosaf. supra 8b. s.v. [H]. Cur. edd. in parenthesis, 'Antigonus'.
37. Of course they are. Consequently they should have been subject to the same law as beasts and wild animals.
38. Since he made them subject to a different law.
39. If he had not differed, there would have been no point in R. Hanina's statement, 'I would approve … that of the Sages'.
40. In R. Hanina's statement.
41. Lit., 'not?'
42. That the birth is regarded as valid.
43. Lit., 'yes'.
44. Who also have their eyes in the sides of their heads. If according to the Rabbis an abortion of the former causes uncleanness why should not also the latter?
45. Which beasts and wild animals have not.
46. Who is entitled to effect the betrothal of his daughter while she is a minor.
47. Which is a valid kinyan (v. Glos.) in the case of a normal child.
48. Such an absurd betrothal.
49. To marry the man who betrothed it. It is forbidden to marry a wife's sister.
50. Since a wife's sister is forbidden to a man only during the lifetime of his wife.
51. That an abortion of a beast or wild animal is regarded as a valid birth.
52. Beast born from beast or wild animal from wild animal.
53. But not when a woman aborted such creatures. The question of wife's sisters, consequently, could never arise in such a case. What then was the point in R. Jeremiah's peculiar enquiry?
54. By his absurd enquiries.
55. It is forbidden to indulge in laughter in this world (cf. Ber. 31a).

R. Adda b. Ahaba enquired of Abaye: According to R. Meir who ruled that a beast that was in the bowels of a woman is a valid birth, what is the ruling where a human child was in the bowels of a beast?¹⁴  — In what respect does this matter? — In that of permitting it to be eaten.¹⁵  But why can you not solve this question from the following ruling of R. Johanan; for R. Johanan ruled: If one slaughtered a beast and found in it an object of the shape of a dove it¹⁶  is forbidden to be eaten?¹⁷  — What a comparison! In that case¹⁶  there are neither cloven feet nor hoofs, but in this case, granted that there are no cloven feet, there is at least some thing like a hoof.¹⁸

THE SAGES, HOWEVER, RULED: ANYTHING THAT HAS NOT etc. R. Jeremiah b. Abba citing Rab stated: All¹⁹  agree that if its body was that of a he-goat and its face that of a human being it is regarded as a human child;²⁰  if its body was that of a human being and its face that of a he-goat it is no valid birth.²⁰  They¹⁹  differ only where it had the face of a human being but was so created that one of its eyes was like that of a beast, since R. Meir holds that it²¹  need only have some of the features of a human face²²  while the Sages hold that it²¹  must have all the features of a human face. They²³  said to R. Jeremiah b. Abba, Was not the reverse taught: R. Meir said, 'It must have all the features of a human face'²⁴  while the Sages said, 'It need only have some of the features of a human face'?²⁴  — He answered them: If this was taught so you may well rely on it.²⁵

R. Jeremiah b. Abba citing R. Johanan ruled:²⁶  The forehead, the eyebrows, the eyes, the cheeks and the chin must all be present at the same time.²⁷  Raba, however, citing Hasa ruled:²⁶  The forehead, the eyebrow, the eye, the cheek and the chin must all be present at the same time.²⁷  These, however,²⁸  do not differ in principle from one another, since the former ruled according to him who said that²⁷  'it must have all the features of a human face'. while the latter ruled according to him who stated, 'it need only have some of the features of a human face'.

An objection was raised: By the 'shape of the face' of which the Sages spoke²⁹  was meant the presence of even only one of the features of the face,³⁰  except the ear.³¹  This shows, does it not, that a single feature suffices?³²  — Abaye replied: That³³  was taught only to indicate what constitutes a hindrance,³⁴  and it³³  is in agreement with him who stated [that the reading]³⁵  was 'it must have all the features of a human face'. And if you prefer I might say: It³³  is in fact in agreement with him who stated that the reading³⁵  was it need only have one of the features of a human face' but³⁶  the meaning³⁷  of 'one'³⁸  is one of each.³⁹

Raba ruled: If a foetus was created with one eye and one thigh, the woman who gives birth to it⁴⁰  is unclean⁴¹  if these were on the side,⁴²  but if they were in the middle⁴³  she is clean.⁴⁴  Raba further ruled: If a child's gullet is perforated⁴⁵  his mother is unclean,⁴⁶  but if his gullet is closed up⁴⁷  she is clean.⁴⁸

Our Rabbis taught: If a woman aborted a stumped body she is not unclean by reason of such a birth. And what is meant by a stumped body? — Rabbi replied: One short of a part which if taken from a live person would cause him to die. And what is the extent of the part that if taken from a live person would cause him to die? — R. Zakkai replied:

1. That an abortion of a beast or wild animal is not viable.
2. In regard to the birthright. If a son is born after such an abortion, though he is entitled to a double share in his father's estate (as a firstborn son, since the abortion is not viable) he (unlike an actual firstborn son) need not be redeemed from the priest. The words in square brackets are wanting in the Mishnah Bek. 46a and appear in cur. edd. here in parenthesis.
3. Even (cf. prev. n.) as regards the exemption from redemption of the son born after it.
4. Flat, fish-shaped.
5. Bek. 46a. Cf. supra n. 2.
6. Of course not. Since, however, he is so regarded in respect of inheritance it is obvious that an abortion of the nature described is not viable.
7. Inheritance.
8. From its viability.
9. Deut. XXI, 17. E.V., The first of his strength.
10. If he dies.
11. The father's.
12. Cf. prev. n. but one.
13. Hence it is that an abortion cannot be treated as 'firstborn' and the privilege is, therefore, passed on to the next child if it is a son.
14. And was discovered after the beast had been slain.
15. Like the beast in which it was found.
16. The dove-like object.
17. Hul. 69a.
18. The two cases cannot consequently be compared, and the fanciful question must remain unsolved.
19. R. Meir and the Sages.
20. The face being the determining factor.
21. To be a valid birth.
22. One human eye, therefore, suffices.
23. So Bomb. ed. and marg. gl. Cur. edd. 'he'.
24. For a justification of the rendering cf. Tosaf.
25. Lit., 'it was taught', sc. while he was certain that what he reported had behind it the weighty authority of Rab, it was quite legitimate for them, since they had a tradition to the contrary, to follow their own tradition.
26. According to the Rabbis (v. infra).
27. If the abortion is to be regarded as a valid birth.
28. R. Johanan and Hasa, though with the exception of the forehead, the former speaks in the plural and the latter in the singular.
29. As a determining factor whether an abortion is a valid birth.
30. One eye or the forehead, for instance.
31. Tosef. Nid. IV. Though the ear has the human shape the abortion is no valid birth if the other features are like those of a beast.
32. To determine that a birth is valid. How then could it he said supra that all the features must be human?
33. The Baraitha just cited as an objection.
34. Sc. that even the presence of one feature that was not human causes the abortion, according to the Rabbis, to be regarded as an invalid birth.
35. According to the Rabbis.
36. In justification of Hasa's ruling.
37. Lit., 'and what (is the meaning of)'.
38. 'One of the features of the face', in the Baraitha cited.
39. Of the double features; as Hasa in fact stated.
40. Lit., 'its mother'.
41. As one who bore a normal child.
42. Of the face and body respectively. sc. in their normal position.
43. Cf. prev. n. mut. mut.
44. Since such an abortion is no valid birth.
45. When it is born.
46. Because, the child being viable, the birth is valid.
47. So that the child is not viable.
48. Such a birth being invalid.