Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Shabbath

Folio 72a

if one cohabits five times with a betrothed bondmaid,¹  he is liable to one [guilt-offering] only.²  R. Hamnuna objected: If so, if one cohabits, sets aside a sacrifice, and states, 'Wait for me until I cohabit again,'³  is he then liable to only one?⁴  — Said he to him, You speak of an act after separation [of the sacrifice]: in such a case I did not state [my ruling].⁵

When R. Dimi came,⁶  he said: On the view that a certain guilt-offering requires previous knowledge: If one cohabits five times with a betrothed maiden, he is liable for each [act]. Said Abaye to him, But in the case of a sin-offering [definite] knowledge is required beforehand,⁷  yet R. Johanan and Resh Lakish differ [therein]?⁸  He remained silent. Said he to him, Perhaps you refer to an act after separation [of the sacrifice], and as R. Hamnuna?⁹  Even so, he replied.

When Rabin came,⁶  he said: All agree about a betrothed bondmaid [in one respect], and ali agree about a betrothed bondmaid [in another respect], and there is disagreement about a betrothed bondmaid [in a third respect].¹⁰  [Thus:] All agree in the case of [coition with] a betrothed bondmaid, that one is liable only to one [sacrifice], as Ulla. All agree in the case of [coition with] a betrothed bondmaid, that one is liable for each, as R. Hamnuna. And there is disagreement about a betrothed bondmaid: on the view that a certain guilt-offering requires previous knowledge, there is disagreement between R. Johanan and Resh Lakish.¹¹ 

It was stated:

1. Unwittingly. Between each act of coition he learnt of his previous offence.
2. Since knowledge of guilt is not required, the knowledge that he does possess is insufficient to separate his actions and necessitate a sacrifice for each. But on the view that previous knowledge is essential for a guilt-offering, this matter will be disputed by R. Johanan and Resh Lakish, as on 71b. — Though we do not find a doubtful guilt-offering for doubtful coition, and so it would appear that here at least knowledge is essential, for otherwise how does he know that he sinned at all, a sacrifice is nevertheless conceivable without previous knowledge. Thus: when in doubt one might bring a conditional sacrifice and stipulate: 'If I have sinned, let this be a certain guilt-offering; if not, let this be a peace-offering' (Tosaf.).
3. So that this sacrifice may atone for both. — Even conscious coition with a betrothed bondmaid necessitates a sacrifice, though in all other cases only an unwitting offence entails an offering.
4. Surely not!
5. For this certainly divides the offences, and a sacrifice is required for each.
6. V. p. 12, n. 9.
7. That an offence was committed. If one brings a sin-offering before he knows that he has sinned, and then learns that he has sinned, the sacrifice is invalid for atonement.
8. And the same principle applies here. How then can you make a general statement?
9. Whereas R. Johanan and Resh Lakish differ where all his actions were committed before the separation of an animal for a sacrifice.
10. 'All' and 'there is disagreement' refer to the views of R. Johanan and Resh Lakish.
11. V. p. 343. n. 5.

If one intended to lift up something detached, but cut off something attached [to the soil],¹  he is not culpable. [If he intended] to cut something detached, but cut something attached [instead],²  Raba ruled: He is not culpable; Abaye maintained: He is culpable.³  Raba ruled, He is not culpable, since he had no intention of a prohibited cutting.⁴  Abaye maintained: He is culpable, since he had the intention of cutting in general.⁵

Raba said, How do I know it? Because it was taught: [In one respect] the Sabbath is more stringent than other precepts; [in another respect] other precepts are more stringent than the Sabbath. The Sabbath is more stringent than other precepts in that if one performs two [labours] in one state of unawareness, he is culpable on account of each separately; this is not so in the case of other precepts. Other precepts are more stringent than the Sabbath, for in their case if an injunction is unwittingly and unintentionally violated, atonement must be made: this is not so with respect to the Sabbath.

The Master said: 'The Sabbath is more stringent than other precepts in that if one performs two [labours] in one state of unawareness, he is culpable on account of each separately: this is not so in the case of other precepts.' How is this meant? Shall we say, that he performed reaping and grinding? Then an analogous violation of other precepts would be the partaking of heleb and blood — then in both cases two [penalties] are incurred! But how is it possible in the case of other precepts that only one liability is incurred? If one ate heleb twice;⁶  then by analogy, with respect to the Sabbath [it means] that he performed reaping twice — then in each case only one liability is incurred? — After all, it means that he performed reaping and grinding, and what is meant by 'this is not so in the case of other precepts'? This refers to idolatry, and is in accordance with R. Ammi, who said: If one sacrificed, burnt incense, and made libations [to an idol] in one state of unawareness, he is only liable to one [sacrifice].⁷  How have you explained it: as referring to idolatry? Then consider the second clause: Other precepts are more stringent [than the Sabbath], for in their case if an injunction is unwittingly and unintentionally violated, atonement must be made: this is not so with respect to the Sabbath. Now, how is an unwitting and unintentional transgression of idolatry possible? Shall we say that one thought it [sc. an idolatrous shrine] to be a synagogue and bowed down to it — then his heart was to Heaven! But if he saw a royal statue and bowed down to it — what are the circumstances? If he accepted it as a god, he is a wilful sinner; while if he did not accept it as a god, he has not committed idolatry at all!⁸  Hence it must mean [that he worshipped it idolatrously] through love or fear:⁹  now this agrees with Abaye's view that a penalty is incurred;¹⁰  but on Raba's view that there is no culpability, what can you say? Rather it must refer to one who thinks that it [sc. idolatry] is permitted.¹¹  Then 'this is not so in the case of the Sabbath' means that there is no liability at all! Yet when Raba questioned R. Nahman,¹²  it was only whether one is liable to one [sacrifice] or to two, but certainly not to exempt him completely!

1. The latter is a forbidden act on the Sabbath. Rashi: e.g., if a knife fell down amidst growing corn, and whilst intending to lift it up one cut the corn.
2. R. Tam: e.g., he thought it was a detached bundle of corn, but after cutting it he discovered that it had been attached.
3. Throughout the Talmud Abaye's view is always quoted before Raba's. Hence it is suggested that either the order should be reversed here, or Rabbah (Abaye's teacher) should be read instead of Raba, v. Marginal Gloss.
4. Whereas in order to be culpable he must have intended to do what he did, save that his offence was unintentional either because he did not know that it was the Sabbath or that that action is forbidden on the Sabbath.
5. Whereas to avoid culpability he must have had no intention of cutting at all.
6. In one state of unawareness, not being reminded in between that heleb is forbidden.
7. Though he performed a number of services.
8. Lit., 'it is nothing'.
9. And this is called unwitting and unintentional, for it was unwitting in so far as he thought this permissible.
10. V. Sanh. 61b.
11. E.g., if he was brought up among heathens. Since he has never known of any prohibition, it is regarded not only as unwitting but as unintentional too.
12. About such a case. v. supra 70b. Where one forgets both the Sabbath and the forbidden labours it is tantamount to ignorance of the Sabbath altogether, and is thus analogous to the belief that idolatry is permitted.